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ABSTRACT
One of the bedrock principles of American constitutional jurisprudence is its commitment to provide heightened
scrutiny to laws that distinguish amongst us on the basis of certain immutable traits. But race—the very trait
that has historically received the most searching form of scrutiny under modern equal-protection doctrine—is far
more fluid than the law has traditionally recognized. This Article examines the mutability of race—both through
its social and legal construction—and the resulting impact of that fluidity on the theoretical underpinnings of
constitutional jurisprudence. Specifically, using examples such as the debates around Rachel Dolezal and
Elizabeth Warren’s heritage, the Census Bureau’s recent proposal to create a new race (MENA) for certain
individuals previously classified as white, legal controversies around eligibility requirements for affirmative action
policies, and discrimination claims involving language use and personal appearance, this Article argues that
modern understandings about the mutability of race can inform interpretations of the scope of Fourteenth
Amendment protections and their application to broader notions of identity, whether fixed or chosen. In short, the
Article calls for a more robust understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment that moves beyond the myopic and illconceived fetishization of immutability that has problematically guided equal-protection jurisprudence over the past
half-century.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2020, I may change my race. For better or worse, however, I will not
find myself alone in this enterprise. Several million of my fellow Americans
may join me in this fantastical journey by going to bed one night as white
people and waking up the next morning as something quite different. While
one might suspect this remarkable transformation is the result of a magical
new serum, a parlor trick, or some mystical hocus-pocus, it decidedly is not.
Instead, it is the product of the bureaucratic machinery of the state. Just in
time for its next decennial tally, the United States Census Bureau has
undertaken serious consideration of a proposal to create, ex nihilo, an entirely
new racial category that has never before existed: MENA.1 If race is a
biological and immutable fact, our government has a funny way of showing
it.
For at least the last century, individuals of Middle Eastern and North
African descent have found themselves formally, albeit tenuously, deemed
white by law.2 The reasons for this categorization are multifarious.3 Pseudoscientific efforts to categorize the races of humanity created a broad
Caucasian category, with which the term white was conflated.4

1

2

3
4

See U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Presentation for Nat’l Advisory Comm. on
Racial, Ethnic, & Other Populations (Oct. 3, 2016), https://www2.census.gov/cac/nac/
meetings/2016-10/2016-nac-jones.pdf (analyzing quality of census data when a dedicated MENA
response category was included).
See, e.g., JOHN TEHRANIAN, WHITEWASHED: AMERICA’S INVISIBLE MIDDLE EASTERN MINORITY
36–37 (2009) (discussing the catch-22 of Middle-Eastern racial identity where individuals of MiddleEastern descent are considered white by law but not on the street); John Tehranian, Performing
Whiteness: Naturalization Litigation and the Construction of Racial Identity in America, 109 YALE L.J. 817, 839
(2000) (analyzing the whiteness naturalization trials of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries and noting that “racial-determination games often produce judicial opinions riddled with
internal contradictions and dadaistic logic that find Arabs to qualify as white in some situations and
nonwhite in others”).
See, e.g., John Tehranian, Compulsory Whiteness: Towards a Middle Eastern Legal Scholarship, 82 IND. L.J.
1, 12 (2007) (tracing the origins of the legal categorization of Middle Easterners as white).
See JOHANN FRIEDRICH BLUMENBACH, ON THE NATURAL VARIETY OF MANKIND 98–99
(Thomas Bendyshe ed., Bergman Publishers 1969) (1775); THOMAS H. HUXLEY, On The Methods
and Results of Ethnology, in MAN’S PLACE IN NATURE AND OTHER ANTHROPOLOGICAL ESSAYS,
209, 244–45 (1896) (“Of all the odd myths that have arisen in the scientific world, the ‘Caucasian
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Naturalization trials at the end of the nineteenth century and early twentieth
century pressed for the inclusion of Arabs, Armenians, and others from the
Levant into the white category.5 The largely Christian emigration from the
region also played a strong role in the process, as perceptions of race and
religion have historically gone hand in hand.6 As a result, our modern
classification system has designated four broad racial divisions (American
Indian/Alaska Native; Asian or Pacific Islander; Black; and White),7 with the
white category defined to include “persons originating in Europe, the Middle
East, and North Africa.”8 This scheme, formally adopted by the Census

5
6

7

8

mystery,’ invented quite innocently by Blumenbach, is the oddest. A Georgian woman’s skull was
the handsomest in his collection. Hence it became his model exemplar of human skulls, from which
all others might be regarded as deviations; and out of this, by some strange intellectual hocus-pocus,
grew up the notion that the Caucasian man is the prototypic ‘Adamic’ man.”); see also Dow v. United
States, 226 F. 145, 146 (4th Cir. 1915) (noting how Blumenbach’s work, and his naming of the
Caucasian race, “became known” and “generally accepted” in the United States upon its
translation into English in 1807).
See Tehranian, Compulsory Whiteness, supra note 3, at 11–17.
Until the 1960s, the vast majority of individuals of Middle Eastern descent coming to the country
were Christian. In 1924, there were approximately 200,000 Arabs living in the United States and
approximately 90% of them were Christian. See Louise Cainkar, Immigration to the U.S., in ARAB
AMERICAN ENCYCLOPEDIA (2000) (describing the immigration of Arabs to the United States
during the Great Migration). Since 1965, 60% have been Muslim. See Karen Engle, Constructing
Good Aliens and Good Citizens: Legitimizing the War on Terror(ism), 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 59, 74 (2004)
(analyzing how the demographics of the Arab population in the United States have changed over
time). This dramatic change in the religious composition of immigrants from the Middle East in
recent years has, perhaps, not coincidentally led to renewed questioning as to whether individuals
of MENA descent are white. For more on the general tendency to link Christianity with whiteness,
see generally TEHRANIAN, WHITEWASHED, supra note 2, at 28–29, 69–70 (describing the historic
conflation of race and religious affiliation); Tehranian, Compulsory Whiteness, supra note 3, at 12
(noting that “the Armenian’s historical affiliation with Christianity and their impressive capacity for
assimilation and intermarriage, attested to by expert witnesses, enabled the court to confidently
proclaim them white by law”) (footnote omitted).
See 28 C.F.R. § 42.402(e) (2019) (defining designations of persons by race, color, or national origin).
The classification stems from the categories announced by the Office of Management and Budget
in 1977 in its Directive No. 15. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, DIRECTIVE NO. 15, RACE AND ETHNIC STANDARDS FOR FEDERAL STATISTICS AND
ADMINISTRATIVE REPORTING (1977) (defining racial and ethnic categories for federal statistics
and program administrative reporting). Hispanics are notably missing from the list as that identity
is considered a cultural/ethnic category, rather than a racial one, as per Directive No. 15. See id.
Id.
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Bureau in 1980,9 has quickly spread in use, both legally and socially, making
it “felt well beyond the arena of demographics into the civic, political, and
economic life of the country.”10
The Census Bureau’s MENA proposal makes a notable change to the
modern classifications. Specifically, it seeks to limit the designation ‘white’
to only those who trace their ancestry to the historical peoples of Europe.11
In turn, it spins out the remainder of the erstwhile ‘white’ category into the
separate MENA grouping that would apply to any “person having origins in
any of the original people of the Middle East and North Africa.”12 The
Bureau’s preliminary definition of MENA included nine illustrative examples
that captured the three largest Middle-Eastern Arab nationalities (Lebanese,
Syrian and Iraqi), the three largest North-African Arab nationalities
(Egyptian, Moroccan and Algerian), two of the largest non-Arab Middle
Eastern nationalities (Iranian and Israeli), and a transnational, non-Arab
group (Kurdish).13
The MENA proposal is, unsurprisingly, not without controversy. Some
have hailed the new category as an important recognition of the distinct
identity of individuals who trace their heritage to the Middle East and North
Africa.14 In addition, adoption and use of the designation may help better
align our bureaucratic classifications with popular perceptions, monitor

9
10
11
12

13
14

See History: 1980 (Population), U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/history/www/
through_the_decades/index_of_questions/1980_population.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2019).
Helen Hatab Samhan, Not-Quite-White: Racial Classification and the Arab-American Experience in ARABS
IN AMERICA: BUILDING A NEW FUTURE 209, 215 (Michael W. Suleiman ed., 1999).
See U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 1 (noting that when no MENA category is available, MENA
respondents often use the “White” category).
Proposals from the Federal Interagency Working Group for Revision of the Standards for
Maintaining, Collecting, and Presenting Federal Data on Race and Ethnicity, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,242,
12,245 (Mar. 1, 2017).
See id. at 12,245 n.1.
See, e.g., Support Adding a MENA Category to the U.S. Census, ARAB AM. INST. (Oct. 18, 2016),
https://www.aaiusa.org/support_adding_a_mena_category_to_the_u_s_census (arguing that
“[c]reating a separate aggregate response category for Middle Eastern or North African origin will
better equip the U.S. to understand a growing constituency, allocate federal aid that addresses
community-based needs and enforce civil rights laws”).
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discrimination (and remediation thereof), and produce valuable
socioeconomic data. There are, however, reasons to be less sanguine about
MENA.15 There are lingering questions to address about the exclusion of
certain peoples (such as individuals of Turkish, Armenian, Afghani, and
Azeri descent) from the classification.16 Perhaps most significantly, some
observers have questioned the government’s sudden, post-9/11 interest—
after decades of categorizing such individuals as white—in getting a precise
and disaggregated count of our Middle Eastern population.17 The timing is
indeed suspicious, coming at a moment when the war on terrorism continues
to dominate the public imagination and when our reigning presidential
administration has implemented an immigration ban on individuals hailing
from numerous Middle Eastern countries—a ban that was blessed (albeit by
the thinnest of margins) as constitutional by the Supreme Court.18
All told, there are many serious questions surrounding MENA. But,
putting aside inquiries about the motivations behind the policy and the issues
it raises, the potential creation of the new MENA category highlights a salient
point about the inherently volatile nature of the race-identification

15

16

17

18

For example, there is the issue of nomenclature. The leading proposal, which bills this new group
‘MENA,’ is far from ideal. Other racial groups get full words (Hispanic, Pacific Islander, Asian),
not an acronym that sounds bureaucratic and mildly sinister with its “MEAN-A” pronunciation
and resemblance to the most prominent English word that begins with the letters m-e-n-a: menace.
Eastern Mediterranean or Levantine might be preferable terms, as neither ossifies an Anglo-centric
viewpoint about the region’s relative location to the Western world (i.e., in the ‘Middle East’)—a
viewpoint so encumbered with political and historical baggage.
Indeed, it is unknown precisely which populations the group encompasses. For example, Turkey
was curiously left out of the initial proposal. Although almost any dictionary definition of the
Middle East has long contained Turkey, Turkey is also a member of the EU and has long styled
itself as a European country. One might reasonably speculate, therefore, whether the conspicuous
absence of Turkish-Americans from the MENA category might constitute a move to support the
efforts of the Turkish government to look westward and to eschew categorization into a group that
some fear may just be a monitoring tool by the government to better surveil unpopular populations.
See Khaled A. Beydoun, Boxed In: Reclassification of Arab Americans on the U.S. Census as Progress or Peril?,
47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 693, 743–751 (2016) (analyzing “concerning ramifications that the proposed
reform [the MENA designation] poses to Arab Americans,” including the facilitation of “War on
Terror policing”).
See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018) (overturning lower courts’ striking of the
aforementioned ban as unconstitutional).

November 2019]

CHANGING RACE

7

enterprise. In particular, MENA provides the latest instantiation of a trend
that our courts have long ignored: racial fluidity.
On one hand, one of the bedrock principles of American constitutional
law is its commitment to provide heightened scrutiny to laws that unfairly
distinguish amongst us on the basis of immutable traits—traits that are mere
“accidents of birth” and have no link to individual merit.19 The Supreme
Court has deemed race to constitute just such a trait and, as a result, under
its consistent precedent, racial classifications have received strict scrutiny.20
On the other hand, the study of history, biology, sociology, and even the law
suggests that racial identities are far from immutable;21 indeed, they are fluid,
as the very creation of the MENA category illustrates. This resulting state of
affairs leaves us with a critical tension that remains unappreciated and undertheorized: the intellectual superstructure of our equal-protection doctrine
rests on the purported immutability of race while, in fact, it is clear that racial
identity is malleable and can change—not only over time and place but also
through forces both within and without. This central tension, with which the
extant constitutional literature has failed to grapple, serves as the focus of this
Article. In this analysis, we reexamine the notion of equal protection in light
of the fact that racial identity is not as rigid as it was once thought to be.
Part I of this Article begins by establishing the tension between the theory
and praxis in the Supreme Court’s equal-protection doctrine, particularly as
it relates to the immutability factor. While our constitutional jurisprudence

19
20

21

See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686–87 (1973) (plurality opinion) (referring to the
importance of immutability as a basis for heightened scrutiny of sex-based classifications).
Even Korematsu v. United States, which upheld an exclusion order and the internment of Japanese
Americans on the West Coast of the United States during World War II, purported to apply strict
scrutiny to race-based classifications. 323 U.S. 214, 216–19 (1944) (noting that “all legal restrictions
which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect,” but that “[p]ressing
public necessity,” but never “racial antagonism,” can serve as a potential ground to justify a policy
that discriminates on the basis of race).
See, e.g., Ken Nakasu Davison, The Mixed-Race Experience: Treatment of Racially Miscategorized Individuals
under Title VII, 12 ASIAN L.J. 161, 161 (2005) (“Social characteristics such as one’s language, manner
of speech, style of hair, attire and choice of friends are all factors that are commonly viewed as
indicators of a person’s racial ancestry, but remain unprotected under a mutability analysis.”).
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has deemed the immutability of race a “fact,”22 social realities tell a different
story. In examining both the temporal and spatial fluidity of race, we
document the existence of two different types of racial mutability: the
changing of racial schemata themselves and the ways in which an individual’s
racial designation can vary within a given scheme. While the first form of
mutability offers little opportunity for agency in the process of racialization,
the second form does. We therefore assess the level of individual choice in
the operation of racial hermeneutics, a fact that is documented by the
growing body of empirical research in the social science literature that has
identified the surprisingly high rates of racial transformation. Part I
concludes by examining the mutability of race through that most ubiquitous
of cultural barometers: Kim Kardashian.
Part II explores the consequences of this stark dichotomy between de jure
immutability and de facto fluidity. We begin by tracing the oddly haphazard
origins of the immutability factor in equal-protection jurisprudence. As we
document, the notion of immutability as a central criterion in the
determination of suspect classifications entitled to heightened scrutiny
originally entered the legal lexicon with an influential commentary from the
Harvard Law Review.23 The Supreme Court then adopted the commentary’s
emphasis on immutability in Frontiero v. Richardson24 in a manner that made
argumentative and rhetorical sense for the purposes of that case (the
extension of equal protection to gender) but lacked rigor for the purposes of
more widespread embrace. With the unusual history of the trope’s
appearance into the equal-protection calculus in mind, we then consider how
immutability’s centrality has shaped the development of anti-discrimination

22

23

24

See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 338 n.32 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (referring to the “fact
that race is an immutable characteristic,” yet cautioning that said immutability does not suggest
there is anything certain or immutable about “the political behavior of the members of any racial
class.”).
Developments in the Law—Equal Protection (The Concept of Equality: The View from a Wide Perspective), 82
HARV. L. REV. 1159, 1167 (1969) (providing an overview of the evolution of equal-protection
jurisprudence and analyzing standards for reviewing legislation distinguishing on the basis of certain
traits, including “immutable characteristics such as race, color, or lineage”).
See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686.
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jurisprudence and juridical inquiries into fairness. Specifically, we examine
how the fetishization of immutability has actively stunted the evolution of
equal-protection doctrine by impeding the development of a more robust
conception of equality: a constitutional jurisprudence of acceptance that
brings the Fourteenth Amendment into better alignment with the First
Amendment. To that end, we assess how a proper reconciliation of the
realities of racial fluidity would reconceptualize equal-protection
jurisprudence in two different contexts: race-adjunct (as illustrated by an
analysis of jurisprudence involving language, personal appearance, and
cultural censorship) and extra-racial (as illustrated by an exegesis of the
Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Obergefell v. Hodges25). Thus, Part II
establishes that modern understandings about the mutability of race can
inform interpretations of the scope of Fourteenth Amendment protections
and their application to broader notions of identity, whether fixed or chosen.
Finally, the Article concludes by reflecting on some of the challenges that
the realities of racial fluidity poses to constitutional jurisprudence. Curiously,
it appears that notions about the immutability of race are far more
immutable than race itself. And, acknowledging the fluidity of race comes
with certain complications which will form the focus of both future
scholarship and jurisprudence. First, the Supreme Court will have to
consider whether wholesale abandonment of the conception of immutability
makes sense or if a more pliable notion of immutability, which some lower
courts and state courts have adopted, would make better sense for application
in constitutional jurisprudence. Second, courts will have to develop new
standards to distinguish between those mutable traits that will receive
heightened scrutiny and those traits which will not. Finally, recognition of
racial transitions could impact the viability of remedial race-based policies
such as affirmative action and magnify the problem of race ‘fraud.’ We assess
these three challenges as part of the process of supporting a more robust
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment that moves beyond the myopic
and ill-conceived fetishization of immutability that has problematically
guided equal-protection jurisprudence over the past half-century.

25

135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597–98 (2015) (holding that same-sex marriage is guaranteed by the Due Process
Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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I. THE MUTABILITY OF RACE
The ubiquitous assumption that race constitutes an immutable trait (if
not the quintessential immutable trait) is fundamental to our modern
constitutional jurisprudence.26 The Supreme Court has gone so far as refer
to “the fact that race is an immutable characteristic.”27 But race’s purported
immutability is no fact at all. Indeed, the laboratory of society has shown
that race is very much a mutable thing. Our examination of the tension
between the de jure assumption of immutability and the de facto reality of
mutability therefore begins with an analysis of the ways in which racial
identities can morph, both contextually and temporally. Specifically, race is
fluid in at least two different senses. First, race is malleable in that racial
schemata themselves change, varying depending on time and place. Fluidity
in this circumstance stems from without. Society, whether through a formal
legal regime or informal norms, determines racial classification. Under this
version of mutability, although race is not formally an “accident of birth”
since categories vary both temporally and spatially, it is almost entirely
imposed upon the individual. Schemata may morph and an individual’s
racial designation might shift as a result, but the individual is largely
powerless to impact that classification.
At the same time, however, race is also fluid in a second sense: an
individual’s place within any given racial scheme might change depending
on context and over time. In this second iteration of mutability, race is not
immutable, but there is greater personal agency in the process of
racialization. Thus, racialization represents an intricate negotiation amongst
at least three players: society, racialized groups, and individuals themselves.
There is agency (and, of course, a strong degree of white privilege) when
Rachel Dolezal goes from white to black28 or Elizabeth Warren deems

26

27
28

See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring) (referring to “the
immutable characteristic of race”); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 398 (1979) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting) (referring to race as “a highly visible and immutable characteristic”).
Vieth, 541 U.S. at 338 n.32 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
See Mark P. Orbe, The Rhetoric of Race, Culture, and Identity: Rachel Dolezal as Co-Cultural Group Member,
6 J. CONTEMP. RHETORIC 23, 23 (2016) (arguing that Dolezal’s “insistence that she was not African
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herself, in whatever capacity, an “American Indian.”29 But such agency is
not limited to those who enjoy white privilege. While not everyone possesses
ethnic or racial options,30 to differing degrees, many individuals (including
those racialized as ‘white’ or ‘of color’) exert at least some level of control
over their racialization. And, based on the growing body of empirical data
from recent sociological research, there is at least some reason to believe that
rates of fluidity may be increasing.31
A. Mutability’s First Iteration: The Sociolegal Evolution of Racial Schemata
In the popular imagination, racial identity represents an immutable trait
and biological fact. But such a view ignores what Michael Omi and Howard
Winant have dubbed the “sociohistorical process by which racial categories
are created, inhabited, transformed, and destroyed.”32 Racialization is an
ideological process—a “process by which social, economic and political
forces determine the content and importance of racial categories, and by
which they are in turn shaped by racial meanings.”33 Racial classification
systems are therefore the products of intricate sociolegal constructs that
morph over time.

29

30
31
32
33

American, but culturally Black triggered critical dialogue around the social construction of race in
the United States, the one-drop rule, and agency issues surrounding assertions of authentic
identity.”).
See Annie Linskey & Amy Gardner, Elizabeth Warren Apologizes for Calling Herself Native American,
WASH. POST (Feb. 5, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/elizabeth-warren-apologizes-for-calling-herself-native-american/2019/02/05/1627df76-2962-11e9-984d9b8fba003e81_story.html (reporting on Elizabeth Warren’s apology for identifying as Native
American for almost two decades).
See WATERS, infra note 39.
See infra notes 81–82, 128–142 and accompanying text.
MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE
1960S TO THE 1990S, at 55 (1994).
Id. at 61.

12

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 22:1

1. A Brief History of the Ideological Construction of Whiteness
The very creation and evolution of the ‘white’ race illustrates this
ideological process in action. Whiteness, of course, is just a concept—and
one whose meaning has changed dramatically since the founding of the
Republic. For those bent on originalism, one need look no further than the
Framers for surprising proof of the malleable definition of whiteness. To
Benjamin Franklin, white racial identity belonged chiefly to individuals of
English descent. As he once wrote, the Angles and Saxons alone made “the
principal Body of White People on the Face of the Earth.”34 He therefore
had no compunction about challenging the whiteness of even the Swedes,
whom he viewed—along with the Germans, French, Italians, Spaniards, and
Russians—as “generally of what we call a swarthy Complexion.”35
Franklin’s musings about the swarthy Swedes are not as anomalous as
they may first appear. American history is rife with examples of the shifting
definition of whiteness. In the 1800s, the Irish faced a century-long battle
against persistent discrimination before finally achieving ‘acceptance’ as
white.36
In the early part of the twentieth century, Italians,37

34
35
36
37

BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING THE INCREASE OF MANKIND (1751),
reprinted in 4 THE PAPERS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 234 (Leonard W. Labaree et al. eds., 1961).
Id.
See, e.g., NOEL IGNATIEV, HOW THE IRISH BECAME WHITE 1, 3 (1995) (documenting the centurylong struggle of Irish-Americans to obtain recognition of their ‘whiteness’ in the United States).
See, e.g., Rollins v. State, 92 So. 35, 36 (Ala. Ct. App. 1922) (reversing the conviction of a black man
for the crime of miscegenation on the grounds that the state had failed to produce competent
evidence that the woman he had married, a Sicilian immigrant, was in fact white by law); LEONARD
DINNERSTEIN & DAVID M. REIMERS, ETHNIC AMERICANS: A HISTORY OF IMMIGRATION AND
ASSIMILATION 36 (1982) (“Italians . . . were one of the most despised groups. Old-stock Americans
called them wops, dagos, and guineas and referred to them as the ‘Chinese of Europe’ and ‘just as
bad as the Negroes.’”). In the South, some Italians were forced to attend all-black schools, see
DINNERSTEIN & REIMERS, supra note 37, and they even endured lynchings. See Thomas A.
Guglielmo, “No Color Barrier”: Italians, Race, and Power in the United States, in ARE ITALIANS WHITE?
29, 35 (Jennifer Guglielmo & Salvatore Salerno eds., 2003) (describing lynchings of Italians that
occurred in the South, West, and Midwest during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries).
In 1875, the New York Times thought it “perhaps hopeless to think of civilizing them, or keeping
them in order, except by the arm of the law.” See DINNERSTEIN & REIMERS, supra note 37. In a
1907 debate on immigration reform, Congressman John Burnett of Alabama, a member of the
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Greeks,38 Slavs,39 and other groups were viewed as non-white. Race riots at
the turn of the century in Nebraska pitted whites against Greeks.40 In parts
of the segregated South, Italian children were often banned from white-only
schools.41 And seemingly tolerant outposts such as Southern California were
far from immune. For example, segregation of public facilities in San
Bernardino extended as recently as the 1940s to individuals of Italian,
Portuguese, and Spanish descent42—a fact recounted in Westminster School

38

39

40
41
42

House of Representatives Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, epitomized the rampant
hostility towards these new immigrants: “I regard the Syrian and peoples from other parts of Asia
Minor as the most undesirable, and the South Italians, Poles and Russians next.” See Nancy Faires
Conklin & Nora Faires, “Colored” and Catholic: The Lebanese in Birmingham, Alabama, in CROSSING THE
WATERS: ARABIC-SPEAKING IMMIGRANTS TO THE UNITED STATES BEFORE 1940, at 69, 76 (Eric
J. Hooglund ed., 1987). According to Burnett, these new immigrant groups were, unequivocally,
not white. Faires & Faires, supra note 37.
Macomber v. State, 291 N.W. 674, 678 (Neb. 1940) (involving a brutal robbery, beating and
forcible sodomization of Greek man with the perpetrator goading the attack by declaring, “You *
* * Greeks ain’t going to run this town, the white people are going to run this town.”); LAWRENCE
H. LARSEN & BARBARA J. COTTRELL, THE GATE CITY: A HISTORY OF OMAHA 166 (1997)
(describing a 1909 race riot in Omaha, Nebraska pitting ‘whites’ against Greeks, when an angry
mob of more than one thousand men gathered in South Omaha and raided “Greek Town,”
destroying businesses, burning buildings and assaulting individuals of Greek descent and noting
that the authorities refused to intervene to stop the mob’s violent actions).
See, e.g., MARY C. WATERS, ETHNIC OPTIONS: CHOOSING IDENTITIES IN AMERICA 2 (1990)
(observing that, at the turn of the century, individuals of Slavic and Mediterranean descent were
viewed as a lower species of humanity, and certainly not as members of the ‘white’ race). As one
candidate for political office wrote in 1920: “They have disqualified the negro, an American citizen,
from voting in the white primary. The Greek and Syrian should also be disqualified. I DON’T
WANT THEIR VOTE. If I can’t be elected by white men, I don’t want the office.” PHILIP K.
HITTI, THE SYRIANS IN AMERICA 89 (1924). His views were not alone. For example, United
States Senator Furnifold McLendel Simmons of North Carolina deemed these immigrant groups
“nothing more than the degenerate progeny of the Asiatic hoards [sic] which, long centuries ago,
overran the shores of the Mediterranean . . . the spawn of the Phoenician curse.” JOHN HIGHAM,
STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM 1860-1925, at 164–65 (1971).
See LARSEN & COTTRELL, supra note 38.
See DINNERSTEIN & REIMERS, supra note 37.
Westminster Sch. Dist. v. Mendez, 161 F.2d 774, 782 (9th Cir. 1947) (noting that, in the case of
Lopez v. Seccombe, 71 F. Supp. 769 (S.D. Cal. 1944), “San Bernardino established a public park and
recreational ground with an area containing a swimming pool and bath house. The mayor, city
councilmen, chief of police and park superintendent, all through their agents, barred from their
entry into the area all persons of Latin descent. The exclusion was not merely of Mexicans but of
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District v. Mendez,43 the famous lawsuit that ended segregation in California
just a few short years before Brown v. Board of Education44 deemed it
unconstitutional nationwide.
The law itself has played an instrumental role in the process of
racialization (and its mutability). Until 1952, federal law dictated that only
white or black individuals could qualify for naturalization.45 As a result, a
wave of immigrants with racially “ambiguous” backgrounds—from
Japanese46 and Indian47 to Armenian48 and Arab49—needed to earn judicial

43
44
45

46

47

48
49

all Latins, that is of people from the score or more Latin American Republics and from Italy, Spain
and Portugal”).
Id.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 394 U.S. 294 (1955).
Until 1952, one had to be either black or white—but nothing ‘in-between’—to be eligible for
naturalization. See Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103, 103 (repealed 1795) (limiting
naturalization to “any alien, being a free white person”); Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 254, § 7, 16 Stat.
254, 256 (amending the naturalization statute to also include “aliens of African nativity and []
persons of American descent.”). This racial limitation on naturalization provoked a series of race
trials, from the late eighteenth century until 1952, where individuals would litigate their whiteness
in order to obtain citizenship (and its attendant benefits at the time, such as the right to vote, the
right to own land, and the right to practice certain professions and take part in certain economic
and social activities). See Tehranian, Performing Whiteness, supra note 2, at 818–20 (noting that there
were fifty-two reported cases litigating the naturalization law’s racial prerequisite from 1878 to 1952
and that naturalization regulations prohibited non-naturalized immigrants from exercising
important economic and social rights).
Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 198 (1922) (rejecting Takao Ozawa’s petition to be declared
white by law and therefore eligible for naturalization, on the grounds that individuals of Japanese
ancestry were not Caucasian).
United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 206 (1923) (considering whether Bhagat Singh Thind, a
“high caste Hindu of full Indian blood, born at Amritsar, Punjab, India,” was a white person for
the purposes of qualifying for naturalization). Overturning a lower court holding, the Supreme
Court held in the negative, arguing that, while Indians might be technically ‘Caucasian,’ and “[i]t
may be true that the blond Scandinavian and the brown Hindu have a common ancestor in the
dim reaches of antiquity, [] the average man knows perfectly well that there are unmistakable and
profound differences between them today.” Id. at 209. Ironically, in this language, the Court
appears to acknowledge the possibility of racial transformation—albeit at glacial (“dim reaches of
antiquity”) rates. Id.
United States v. Cartozian, 6 F.2d 919, 922 (D. Or. 1925) (deeming Tatos O. Cartozian, an
Armenian, white by law and therefore eligible for naturalization).
Compare Ex parte Mohriez, 54 F. Supp. 941, 941 (D. Mass. 1944) (deeming an Arab male, Mohamed
Mohriez, eligible for naturalization since he was a white person) with In re Hassan, 48 F. Supp. 843,
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recognition of their whiteness before they could obtain citizenship.
Whiteness not only gave them the vote, it also entitled them to a series of
economic rights, including the abilities to own land and practice law, that
were restricted at the time to citizens.50 In Minnesota, for example, even
Finnish immigrants had to litigate their whiteness in court when the United
States District Attorney denied them naturalization on the grounds that they
were “Mongolian.”51 While the Japanese and Indians lost these absurd cases
(before the Supreme Court, no less), Arabs and Armenians were narrowly (if
not reluctantly) deemed white.52 After all, the latter were literally found on
the lands adjacent to the Caucasus Mountains which—through some hocuspocus by a German ethnologist who studied skull shapes many hundred years
ago—gave birth to the term ‘Caucasian.’53
2. Racial Fluidity and the History of the Census
The very definition of race, as expounded by perhaps the most celebrated
metric thereof—the decennial United States Census—captures the evolving
notion of whiteness and the morphing of racial epistemologies over time.
While the Census’s role in ascertaining racial identities in its first century of
existence was largely limited to the categories of white, black, and Native

50

51

52
53

846 (E.D. Mich. 1942) (deeming an Arab male, Ahmed Hassan, ineligible for naturalization since
he did not qualify as a white person).
See, e.g., Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225, 233 (1923) (upholding constitutionality of California’s
Alien Property Initiative Act (Alien Land Law) of 1920, 1 Cal. Gen. Laws, Act 261 (Deering 1938),
which prohibited non-citizens from owning real property in California); United States v. Pandit, 15
F.2d 285, 285 (9th Cir. 1926) (noting law preventing non-citizens from practicing law in California);
Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 413 (1948) (scrutinizing California law denying
commercial fishing licenses to non-citizens).
In 1908, United States District Attorney John C. Sweet rejected the naturalization applications of
John Sven and fifteen other Finns. Their cases ultimately ended up in federal court and, on January
17, 1908, Sweet’s decision was reversed by Judge William Cant, who held that Finns, despite claims
of their “Mongol origins,” were white persons eligible for naturalization. See Aleksi Huhta, Debating
Visibility: Race and Visibility in the Finnish-American Press in 1908, 4 NORDIC J. MIGRATION RES. 168,
171 (2014).
See supra notes 46–49.
See supra note 4.
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American,54 the changing racial composition of the country forced the
Census Bureau to eventually confront the issue of racial classification with
greater nuance starting in the late nineteenth century. Notably, during this
era, the Census Bureau’s treatment of various “racial” categories varied
wildly in numerous respects.
For instance, as Susan Koshy55 and Vinay Harpalani56 have
documented, individuals tracing their descent to the Indian sub-continent
have seen their treatment under the Census subject to vertiginous vacillation.
On almost every census conducted by the United States Government
between 1910 and 2000, such individuals found themselves in a different
racial category:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

“Other: Non-White Asiatic/Hindu” (1910)
“Other: Hindu” (1920)
“Hindu” (1930, 1940)
“Other: Non-White/Asiatic Indian” (1950)
“Non-White/Hindu” (1960)
“White” (1970)
“Asian Indian” (1980)
“Asian or Pacific Islander” (1990)
“Asian/Asian Indian” (2000).57

So, while the Census gave individuals of Indian ancestry their own separate
racial category in 1930, it deemed them white in 1970 and then Asian in
1990.58

54
55

56

57
58

From 1790–1840, the Census categorized individuals as free white persons, other/colored free
persons, and slaves.
See Susan Koshy, Category Crisis: South Asian Americans and Questions of Race and Ethnicity, 7 DIASPORA:
J. TRANSNAT’L STUD. 285, 293–94 (1998) (noting the changing classifications of South Asians in
the Census).
See Vinay Harpalani, DesiCrit: Theorizing the Racial Ambiguity of South Asian Americans, 69 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. LAW 77, 134–37 (2013) (referencing Koshy’s observation regarding changing census
classifications).
Id.
Id.
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The Census has also meandered in its categorization of individuals of
Latino descent. As sociologists Vilma Ortiz and Edward Telles point out,
“The issue of how race is collected and analyzed for Mexicans (and
Hispanics) is . . . complicated. The general trend over time has been a shift
from no classification to Mexican as a [separate] race, to Mexicans as White,
to Mexicans as any race.”59 Through 1920, the Census made no mention at
all of individuals of Mexican (or Latin) descent.60 In 1930, ‘Mexican’ was
suddenly given its own racial category on the Census.61 By 1940, however,
the Census did an about-face and formally characterized Mexicans (and

59
60

61

Vilma Ortiz & Edward Telles, Racial Identity and Racial Treatment of Mexican Americans, 4 RACE &
SOCIETAL PROBS., April 2012, at 1, 4 (citations omitted).
See History: 1920, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/history/www/
through_the_decades/index_of_questions/1920_1.html (displaying 1920 census questionnaire)
(last visited Nov. 4, 2019).
The instruction accompanying the “Mexican” racial category on the 1930 census curiously read:
“Mexicans.-Practically all Mexican laborers are of a racial mixture difficult to classify, though
usually well recognized in the localities where they are found. In order to obtain separate figures
for this racial group, it has been decided that all person born in Mexico, or having parents born in
Mexico, who are not definitely white, Negro, Indian, Chinese, or Japanese, should be returned as
Mexican (“Mex”).” 1930 Census: Enumerator Instructions, IPUMS USA, https://usa.ipums.org/
usa/voliii/inst1930.shtml (last visited Nov. 4, 2019). Interestingly, although there were also
instructions as to who should be categorized as “[American] Indian” and “Negro,” there were no
corresponding instructions for the White designation, see id., thereby supporting the notion that,
historically, white has represented the absence of race, a norm that defined by exceptionalism from
the entire conception of race in the first place. As Robin DiAngelo writes, “Because race is
constructed as residing in people of color, whites don’t bear the social burden of race. We move
easily through our society without a sense of ourselves as racialized subjects . . . . We see race as
operating when people of color are present, but all-white spaces as ‘pure’ spaces—untainted by race
vis à vis the absence of the carriers of race (and thereby racial polluters)—people of color.” Robin
DiAngelo, White Fragility, 3 INT’L J. CRITICAL PEDAGOGY 54, 62 (2011) (citations omitted); see also
Richard Dyer, The Matter of Whiteness, in WHITE PRIVILEGE: ESSENTIAL READINGS ON THE OTHER
SIDE OF RACISM 9, 10 (Paul Rothenberg ed., 2005) (“[A]s long as race is something only applied
to non-white peoples, as long as white people are not racially seen and named, they/we function as
a human norm . . . [and] [t]here is no more powerful position than that of being ‘just’ human.”).
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other Hispanics) as white.62 They remained so until 1980, when the category
of Hispanic was deemed a type of culture/heritage, and not a race at all.63
The changing treatment of Hispanics under the Census reflects the
broader societal confusion regarding their place in the American racial
schema. In Texas, for example, Latinos were occasionally considered white,
serving in white National Guard units and possessing the right to marry
white, but not black, partners.64 But, more often than not, they suffered from
the types of discrimination suffered by non-whites.65 Latinos also found
themselves occupying the liminal spaces of whiteness in California. At the
time of the State’s founding, Mexicans were deemed—after lengthy debate—
white enough to receive citizenship, vote, and own land—rights that were
not extended to such groups as the Chinese and Japanese.66 Whites and

62

63
64

65

66

See What Census Calls Us: A Historical Timeline, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (June 10, 2015),
https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/interactives/multiracial-timeline/ (showing changing census
classifications throughout American history).
Id.
Zev Chafets, The Post-Hispanic Hispanic Politician, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE (May 6, 2010),
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/09/magazine/09Mayor-t.html. In 1943, in an apparent
attempt at solidary with Latin American allies fighting World War II and as a means to continue
to secure cooperation with the Mexican government on labor issues, the Texas Legislature even
passed a “Caucasian Race Resolution,” see Thomas A. Guglielmo, Fighting for Caucasian Rights:
Mexicans, Mexican Americans, and the Transnational Struggle for Civil Rights in World War II Texas, 92 J.
AM. HIST. 1212, 1219–23 (2006) (discussing Texas’ Concurrent Resolution 105, which affirmed
equal treatment of all members of the Caucasian race); see generally Pratheepan Gulasekaram & S.
Karthick Ramakrishnan, The President and Immigration Federalism, 68 FLA. L. REV. 101, 126 (2016)
(discussing the adoption of agreements between the executive branches of both the United States
and Mexico in order to prevent discrimination against Mexican-Americans). Notably, however,
the resolution “was non-binding as statutory law.” CARLOS KEVIN BLANTON, GEORGE I.
SANCHEZ: THE LONG FIGHT FOR MEXICAN AMERICAN INTEGRATION 93 (2014)).
See LAURA GOMEZ, MANIFEST DESTINIES: THE MAKING OF THE MEXICAN AMERICAN RACE
(2007); Ariela Gross, Texas Mexicans and the Politics of Whiteness, 21 L. & HIST. REV. 195, 195–205
(2003) (suggesting that Mexicans, while legally considered white, were socially non-white because
they still suffered from rampant discriminatory practices); Ian Haney-Lopez, White Latinos, 6 HARV.
LATINO L. REV. 1 (2003) (contending that leaders of Latino communities who advance Latino
whiteness end up promoting social inequality and mistreatment); see also Clifton v. Puente, 218
S.W.2d 272 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) (challenging racially restrictive covenant prohibiting sale or lease
of property to “persons of Mexican descent”).
This was largely due to the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848, which secured “all the rights of
citizens of the United States” for those Mexicans who remained on the land that was ceded to the
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individuals of Latin descent could also marry at a time when individuals from
other ethnic groups could not ‘miscegenate.’67 All the while, however,
Mexican-Americans endured widespread animus, and were subject to
segregation68 and the use of racially restrictive covenants.69
The tectonics of race continue to shift, and racial schemata are still in the
process of flux, as the Census Bureau’s consideration of a proposal to adopt
a new “MENA” category makes clear. Put in the context of these prior
transformations in the Census’s racial classifications, the creation of the new
MENA category appears routine, if not downright mundane. MENA just
represents a new phase in the ever-changing state of race, in general, and
whiteness, in particular.
All the while, the history leading up to the genesis of MENA highlights
the forces at play in fomenting legal changes in racial definitions. A complex

67
68

69

United States per the Treaty. See TOMAS ALMAGUER, RACIAL FAULT LINES: THE HISTORICAL
ORIGINS OF WHITE SUPREMACY IN CALIFORNIA 9, 54 (1994) (noting that “[t]his international
agreement virtually tied the hands of white convention delegates when the issue of suffrage for
Mexicans was raised” and that the California State Constitutional Convention of 1849, after
fierce[] debate,” decided to “formally grant[] Mexicans the same citizenship rights as ‘free white
persons’ in California . . . while the California Indians, like Indians elsewhere, were deemed
‘nonwhite’ and ineligible for citizenship.”).
Id. at 58.
See, e.g., Mendez v. Westminster Sch. Dist., 64 F. Supp. 544, 545, 551 (S.D. Cal. 1946) (striking, as
unconstitutional, the practice by the Westminster, Garden Grove, Santa Ana and El Modeno
School Districts of excluding Mexican children from so-called white schools); Lopez v. Seccombe,
71 F. Supp. 769, 771–72 (S.D. Cal. 1944) (challenging constitutionality of San Bernardino’s practice
of excluding Mexicans and other individuals of Latino descent from city park and playground).
See, e.g., Complaint at 1, 3, Doss v. Bernal, No. 41466 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1943), cited in ROBERT CHAO
ROMERO & LUIS FERNANDO FERNANDEZ, UNIV. CAL. L.A. CHICANO STUDIES RESEARCH CTR.,
CSRC RESEARCH REPORT NO. 14, DOSS V. BERNAL ENDING MEXICAN APARTHEID IN ORANGE
COUNTY 3 (2012), https://www.chicano.ucla.edu/files/RR14.pdf (striking, as unconstitutional, a
racially restrictive covenant on a property in Fullerton, California that prohibited the property from
being “used, leased, owned or occupied by any Mexicans or persons other than of the Caucasian
race”); Amy Taxin, California Bill Aims to Strike Racist Housing Language, S.D. UNION-TRIBUNE (Mar.
14, 2009), https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-racist-covenants-031409-2009mar14story.html (detailing covenant on a South Gate, California property preventing transfer to buyers
“whose blood is not entirely that of the Caucasian Race, and for the purposes of this paragraph, no
Japanese, Chinese, Mexican, Hindu or any person of the Ethiopian, Indian or Mongolian Races
shall be deemed to be Caucasian.”).
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series of sociopolitical circumstances preceded the bureaucratic change and
triggered the reconceptualization of individuals hailing from the Middle East
within the rubric of whiteness. Put in personal terms, while I might legally
lose my whiteness in 2020, the truth is that I lost my de facto whiteness (if I
ever had it to begin with) long ago—a fact made clear by the waves of
random heightened scrutiny I have inevitably enjoyed through the years at
airports across the land. Sometime between childhood and adolescence, as
my physiognomy grew more unmistakably Semitic, sometime between the
painfully drawn out tragedy of the Iranian Hostage Crisis and the painfully
sudden tragedy of the 9/11 attacks, and sometime between the rise of the
Ayatollah and the fall of the Twin Towers, magic carpets and belly dancers
gave way to terrorism and fundamentalists as the dominant image of the
Middle East. And with that transformation, perceptions of race changed as
the trope of the Middle Eastern as Other became imprinted in the American
mind. Racial identity can be imposed from within and, in evolutionary
terms, the process can take place in the blink of an eye. MENA represents
the culmination of this process.
3. Spatial Variations in Racial Schemata
All the while, racial schemata vary spatially as well. For example, while
the principle of hypodescent has dominated American notions of blackness,70
it has not played as prominent a role in racial conceptions in other countries
such as Brazil. Thus, while the United States has generally adopted a racial
classification system, popularly known as the ‘one-drop rule,’ that has
“grouped all mixed-race offspring of Black and white unions into the Black
category,”71 Brazil’s system reflects more “‘fluid’ multi-racial categories” and
the “comparatively greater vertical and horizontal mobility of African

70
71

See, e.g., VA. CODE § 67 (1930) (“Every person in whom there is ascertainable any negro blood shall
be deemed and taken to be a colored person . . . .”).
D. Wendy Greene, Determining the (In)Determinable: Race in Brazil and the United States, 14 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 143, 155 (2009).
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descendants.”72 In one broad national survey, for example, Brazilians used a
whopping 135 different categories to classify themselves racially.73
Even putting aside bureaucratic categories, geographic context inevitably
impacts the informal process of racialization on the street as racial
epistemologies vary based on location. Nigerian-American author Chris
Abani, the son of an Igbo-Nigerian father and an English mother, poignantly
captures this dynamic in The Face, his mediation on identity in the twentyfirst century. As he recounts:
When I lived in East Los Angeles, a predominantly Chicano/Latino
neighborhood, I was assumed to be Dominican or Panamanian. In Miami,
where I go regularly for religious reasons, I am confused for a Cuban. In
New Zealand, I was assumed to be Maori. In Australia, Aborigine. In
Egypt, Nubian. In Qatar, Pakistani. In South Africa, Zulu or some other
group, depending on who was talking. Other times, because of my accent,
which is a mix of Nigerian, British, and now American inflections, I am
assumed to be from ‘one of the islands.’ No one accepts Nigerianness, not
without argument. In fact, the two things I have been rarely taken for—
Nigerian and white—are the very things that form my DNA.74

As Abani can attest, while one’s DNA may be largely immutable, perceptions
of racial belonging are highly mutable and context-dependent. Racial
determination is an act of reading, with all of the subjective and interpretive
elements of any other process wherein humans seek to give meaning to a
series of signs and symbols. Explains Abani: “Most of the confusion about
who I am is a product of how my face is read. Thus it is perceived to be
where it is thought to belong. And how it is supposed to look.”75 Abani’s
racial ascription therefore morphs in ways beyond his control as he navigates
his way through the geographies of the modern world.

72
73

74
75

Id. at 161.
In its 1976 Pesquisa Nacional por Amostragem de Domiciliois (the National Household Survey, or PNAD),
the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics found individuals using 135 different categories
to self-identify their race. See Sales Augusto dos Santos, Who Is Black in Brazil? A Timely or a False
Question in Brazilian Race Relations in the Era of Affirmative Action? 33 LATIN AM. PERSP. 30, 34 (Obianuju
C. Anya trans., 2006) (choosing, among others, white, light, tawny, moreno, pardo, and black).
CHRIS ABANI, THE FACE: CARTOGRAPHY OF THE VOID 20 (2016).
Id. at 20–21.
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B. Race Mutability’s Second Iteration: The Negotiation of Individual Identity Within a
Given Racial Scheme
But the ascription of race is not just achieved through automatic
application of the extant racial scheme. Racialization also occurs in the
processing of individuals within a given classification system. In this second
iteration of mutability, race is mutable based on how society may locate a
person’s race within its racial epistemology and also how an individual
performs race. On this latter point, Kurt Vonnegut once wrote that “we are
what we pretend to be”76 and individuals change society’s perception of their
race based on the aspects of their identity that they (both consciously and
unconsciously) emphasize and those which they choose to downplay. In the
process, many individuals can successfully manipulate how they are
racialized. This individual control over the racialization process, even if
limited, stems from an important corollary to the social construction of race:
the inherent amorphousness of race.
As Patrick Egan points out:
the ability to claim or deny various racial and ethnic identities rests upon a
bundle of attributes that can include fixed and sticky attributes like accent,
skin tone, facial features, and body morphology, as well as changeable or
concealable attributes like clothing, cultural practices, and the racial and
ethnic identities of one’s parents, spouse or friends. Various mixes of these
attributes can provide individuals with a lot, some, or very little discretion in
identifying with a racial or ethnic group, which can in turn give rise to
identity variation in different contexts, including surveys.77

Tseming Yang adds that opportunities for identity arbitrage have
increased in recent year years due to two key developments.78 First, scientific
and medical advances have given individuals greater ability to manipulate

76
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KURT VONNEGUT, JR., MOTHER NIGHT, at v (Dell Publishing 1999) (1961).
Patrick J. Egan, Identity as Dependent Variable: How Americans Shift Their Identities to Better Align with Their
Politics, AM. J. POL. SCI., at 4 (forthcoming), available at https://wp.nyu.edu/egan/research/
(citing Maya Sen & Omar Wasow, Race as a Bundle of Sticks: Designs That Estimate Effects of Seemingly
Immutable Characteristics, 19 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 499 (2016)).
Tseming Yang, Choice and Fraud in Racial Identification: The Dilemma of Policing Race in Affirmative Action,
the Census, and a Color-Blind Society, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 367, 377 (2006).
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their physical features.79 Second, the growing availability of paper/virtual
identities has provided opportunities for individuals to adopt alternative
racial identities divorced from consideration of phenotype.80
With these developments in mind, it should not be surprising that, “[i]n
the last several decades, . . . [a]s growing numbers of Americans identify as
multiracial, multiethnic, postracial, transgender, gender nonconforming,
and bi (or multi) religious—[] ‘fluid identities’—it is increasingly difficult to
profess with confidence ‘what’ a person is absent his or her input.”81 Thus,
as Leora Eisenstadt concludes in her contemplation of identity fluidity, “the
number of individuals who refuse to identify in a single category is increasing
exponentially.”82 But importantly, it is not just multi-ethnic individuals or
those who recoil at the idea of having racial ascription imposed upon them
who enjoy racial fluidity. As we shall see, a recent series of studies in the
social sciences indicate that actual rates of racial fluidity are surprisingly high
and that individuals can often play a role in their racialization, including by
adopting such practices as passing83 and covering.84 With the opportunity
for racial fluidity in place, individuals can exert control over their
racialization for personal and strategic social, political and economic
purposes.85

79
80
81
82
83

84

85

Id. at 377–78.
Id. at 378–80.
Leora F. Eisenstadt, Fluid Identity Discrimination, 52 AM. BUS. L.J. 789, 790 (2015).
Id.
See RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE, IDENTITY, AND
ADOPTION 283 (2003) (defining the practice of passing as “a deception that enables a person to
adopt specific roles or identities from which he or she would otherwise be barred by prevailing
social standards”).
KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS (2006); Kenji
Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 772 (2002) (defining covering as the toning down of a
disfavored identity to fit into the mainstream).
See, e.g., WATERS, supra note 39 (documenting the assimilation and gradual acceptance of European
immigrants who were once considered not to be members of the “white” race).
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1. Identity Arbitrage
a. Strategic Conversion in an East Kenya Farming Community
Located just off the northern coast of Kenya, the Giriama farming
community faced an uneasy transition. Old ways were giving way to new
ones, particularly economically, as market forces began to challenge the
group’s erstwhile egalitarianism. Driven by a generation of young upstarts,
the emergence of this new proto-capitalistic system faced key challenges,
however, as entrenched institutional practices enforcing egalitarian norms
strongly inhibited surplus accumulation. In order to push for a “new ethics
of production” amongst the Giriama, these parvenus had to unshackle
themselves from the inefficient transaction costs associated with traditional
customs and to “disentangle themselves from the demands of kin.”86 The
way they accomplished such a transition is detailed in David J. Parkin’s
fascinating quarter-century study, entitled Palms, Wine, and Witnesses.87
The proto-capitalists amongst the Giriama sought to stockpile land and
palm trees to take advantage of the booming market for copra. But such
transactions typically required participation in (costly) ritualized clientage in
the form of exchange ceremonies with elders that featured both wine and
meat. As Parkin documents, strategic conversion to Islam became a key tool
utilized by the entrepreneurs to achieve their needed freedom to operate. By
becoming (what Parkin dubs) “therapeutic Muslims,”88 these upstarts in the
younger generation avoided the heavy taxation of clientage activities
because, under their new religion, they could neither drink wine nor partake
in eating non-halal meat. In the process, they achieved what Paul Clough
calls “ritual distinctiveness”89 and managed to rationalize their exemption
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Kate Meagher, Trading on Faith: Religious Movements and Informal Economic Governance in Nigeria, 47 J.
MOD. AFR. STUD. 397, 403 (2009).
DAVID J. PARKIN, PALMS, WINE, AND WITNESSES: PUBLIC SPIRIT AND PRIVATE GAIN IN AN
AFRICAN FARMING COMMUNITY (1972).
See PARKIN, supra note 87, at 40–41.
PAUL CLOUGH, MORALITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN RURAL WEST AFRICA: INDIGENOUS
ACCUMULATION IN HAUSALAND 373 (2014).
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from custom without subverting tradition wholesale. In short, they smoothly
opted into a different informal legal regime by altering their outward
religious identities, thereby facilitating the transition to a capitalistic
economy.
Although this story about the Giriama and the strategic conversion to
Islam within their community relates to religious transformation in a bygone
era on a different continent, it captures a process that repeats itself
universally. The deployment of classification arbitrage is, after all, a timehonored practice. When legal regimes create different rules for different
people and individuals enjoy some level of control over which rules apply to
them, there is strong incentive to engage in reclassification—whether it is
individuals seeking to repurpose earnings as capital gains rather than
ordinary income to lower their effective tax rate or baseball players obtaining
therapeutic exemptions for the use of substances otherwise banned as
performance enhancing.90 As such, it is not surprising to see individuals
engage in identity arbitrage with respect to race, manipulating how they are
categorized by the world, for strategic purposes. Both passing and covering
can constitute forms of identity arbitrage91 and, as we shall see, occur
regularly with respect to race, for purposes noble and unscrupulous, in
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See, e.g., Russell A. Carleton, Baseball Therapy: Someone’s Not Paying Attention, BASEBALL PROSPECTUS
(Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.baseballprospectus.com/news/article/28824/baseball-therapysomeones-not-paying-attention/ (noting the statistically aberrational number of major league
players, vis-à-vis the general population, receiving therapeutic exemptions for drugs that would
otherwise be deemed performance enhancing). It is believed that Alex Rodriguez, who was later
banned for 162 games for use of performance enhancing substances, took advantage of the
therapeutic use exemption in both 2007 and 2008. See TIM ELFRINK & GUS GARCIA-ROBERTS,
BLOOD SPORT: ALEX RODRIGUEZ, BIOGENESIS, AND THE QUEST TO END BASEBALL’S STEROID
ERA 3 (2014) (detailing the Biogenesis baseball scandal that involved Alex Rodriguez and other top
baseball stars).
This is not to suggest that all (or even most) forms of passing or covering are the product, whether
conscious or unconscious, of strategic manipulation to achieve social, economic, or political ends.
Often times, passing and covering represent coping strategies to withstand the trauma of
discrimination and ostracization.

26

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 22:1

manners extraordinary and mundane. Regardless of the purpose or manner,
however, these instantiations reflect the individual agency possible in the
racialization process.
b. Name Games: Racial Fluidity and Ambiguity in Electoral Politics
Strategic racial manipulation can often come in comically simple forms.
Modulation in common racial or ethnic signifiers often does the trick. Thus,
for example, a mere change in one’s surname can create possibilities. For
example, divorced from my last name, I enjoy a wide range of racial and
ethnic options. With my last name in tow, I possess only two (depending on
whether one focuses on the first part, or the last part, of my surname).
Beyond the personal, when one examines this issue from a broader
perspective, there is a long history of Anglicization of surnames to facilitate
what we will euphemistically call the assimilation process. Most famously,
generations of Hollywood stars have taken part in this charade.92
Of course, changes can go the other way as well, particularly when
regional demographic considerations are at play in electoral matters.93 As
far-fetched as it might sound, a shrewd Irish-American politician might
nickname his son ‘Beto’ to arm him with an implied tie to the large MexicanAmerican population in one’s community—a move that may assist his son a
generation later when running for U.S. Senate and President as ‘Beto
O’Rourke’ rather than under the birthname of ‘Robert Francis O’Rourke.’94
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Some examples include: Amos Muzyad Yaqoob Kairouz (p/k/a Danny Thomas); Jo Racquel
Tejada (p/k/a Rachel Welch); Ilyena Lydia Vasilievna Mironov (p/k/a Helen Mirren);
Óscar Isaac Hernández Estrada (p/k/a Oscar Isaac); Jennifer Ellen Chan (p/k/a Jennifer Tilly);
Ramon Antonio Gerardo Estevez (p/k/a Martin Sheen); Margarita Cansino (p/k/a Rita
Hayworth).
The tradition, of course, is not limited to performing whiteness. Famously, for example, during the
height of World War I, King George V’s edict changed the British royal family’s surname from
Saxe-Coburg-Gotha to Windsor to appear less German and more English.
See Ruben Navarrette, Jr., For Latinos, ‘Beto’ O’Rourke Is Just Another Privileged White Guy Trying to
Manipulate Them, USA TODAY (Mar. 15, 2019), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/
2019/03/15/beto-orourke-democratic-presidential-race-latino-hispanics-column/3174425002/
(decrying “Beto’s manipulative moniker” and stating that “Patrick O’Rourke — Robert Francis’
father — once explained that he was the one who gave his son the nickname in the first place and
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Or take the example of judges in the state of Florida. Like many other
states, Florida elects its judges. As a result, judicial candidates attempt to
remain responsive to the electorate and, like other political actors whose job
security depends on popularity, they take certain steps to make themselves
more appealing to the voter base. Since electoral politics are rife with racial
considerations, some judicial candidates in Florida have strategically
employed alterations to their names to either accentuate or draw attention
away from aspects of their racial identity. Consider the case of Marina
Garcia-Wood, a Cuban-born woman of Latino descent, who was running
for a seat on Florida’s Seventeenth Judicial Circuit in 2006. As of that time,
voters in Broward County had never elected a Cuban-born judge to the
bench—an unusual state of affairs considering the enormous Cuban
population in that part of Florida. Garcia-Wood suspected that, in part, that
fact may have reflected the unease a certain portion of the electorate may
have had with any Latin judicial candidate.95 So, she changed her name—
at least for the purposes of her 2006 campaign. At the urging of her
campaign advisor, Tony Gargiulo, she dropped her maiden name of Garcia
on the actual ballot, so that her name merely reflected her Anglo surname
Wood, which she adopted from her ex-husband, Dennis Wood. Garcia-

95

the reason had a lot to do with politics, as well as geography. . . . [T]he patriarch reasoned that if
his son ever ran for office in El Paso, the odds of being elected in that largely Mexican-American
city were far greater with a name like Beto.”).
There appears to be good reason for Garcia-Wood’s concern. In 2008, when three Latino judges
appointed by Governor Charlie Crist faced re-election for the first time, all three lost (despite the
heavy incumbency advantage that judges usually enjoy). All three—Catalina Avalos, Pedro Dijols
and Julio Gonzalez—had overtly Latino names. The loss, the Broward Beat reported, “was widely
attributed to them having Hispanic names.” Buddy Nevins, Here We Go Again: Two Hispanic Judges
File for Re-Election, BROWARDBEAT.COM (July 31, 2009), https://www.browardbeat.com/here-wego-again-two-hispanic-judges-file-for-re-election/. In addition, although 53% of Broward
County’s population is non-white or Hispanic, only ten out of ninety judges come from minority
groups. See Tonya Alanez, Judges Question Election Challenges; All 5 Minority Jurists in This Year’s Race
Face Opponents, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, at 1B (July 18, 2010).
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Wood was surprisingly transparent about the ploy. As the Florida Sun
Sentinel reported:
Garcia-Wood said other Hispanics already knew who she was from her
public appearances and campaign literature, where her full name appeared.
It was to avoid alienating other Broward residents who might be reluctant to
vote for a Hispanic judge, she said, that she heeded the recommendation to
delete the ‘Garcia’ part of her name from the ballot. 96

Under the name Marina G. Wood, Garcia-Wood became presumptively
white (or, at the very least, not Hispanic) to those who did not know her. She
won her seat and, soon thereafter, returned to her prior moniker. Following
suit, in 2012, Olga Maria Gonzalez-Levine ran for a Broward County
judgeship and won—under the name “Olga M. Levine.”97
In other parts of Florida, candidates have taken a different tact, changing
their surnames to more overtly suggest that they share Hispanic heritage as
a means to appeal to the large Latino population in the state. In nearby
Miami-Dade County, for example, “political observers say targeting
candidates with non-Hispanic surnames is a time-honored tactic.”98 In a
2006 study on “low-information” elections in Miami-Dade County, political
scientists Marsha Matson and Terri Susan Fine suggested that “when
candidates’ ethnicity can be inferred from their names on the ballot,
Hispanic candidates might be advantaged,” particularly given Miami-Dade’s
status as “a county with one of the largest concentrations of Hispanics in the
United States.”99 Some candidates have taken reports of this perceived
ethnic advantage a tad too far. After her 2014 victory over Cuban-American
challenger Frank Bocanegra, Judge Jacqueline Schwartz fatuously
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Tal Abbady, Judge-elect Hopes She Paves the Way for Other Hispanics, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL (Dec. 29,
2006), https://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/fl-xpm-2006-12-29-0612281172-story.html.
Fred Grimm, South Florida’s Name-Game Politics Has a Familiar Ring, MIAMI HERALD (Nov. 24, 2014),
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/news-columns-blogs/fredgrimm/article4126467.html.
David Ovalle, Ethnic Politics, Ethics Issues Spill Over into Some Judicial Races in Miami-Dade, MIAMI
HERALD (Aug. 1, 2014), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miamidade/article1978044.html.
Marsha Matson & Terri Susan Fine, Gender, Ethnicity, and Ballot Information: Ballot Cues in LowInformation Elections, 6 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 49, 52–53 (2006).
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proclaimed, “I think my re-election is a very significant victory for the people
of Miami Dade County,” gloating that “[w]e have gone past the days when
any nondescript Hispanic name could go on the ballot and defeat any Anglo
sitting judge.”100
Lest one dismiss such racial theatrics to a case of Floridian
exceptionalism,101 political candidates in other regions with large Latino
populations have also thought there is value in tangibly marking their latterday embrace of their (purported) Hispanic roots. Perhaps most cynically of
all, after twice running unsuccessfully as a Republican candidate for
Congress in Arizona’s heavily Hispanic Seventh Congressional District,
Scott Fistler opted to run as a Democrat in 2014 and to change his name.102
His new name was Cesar Chavez.103 His candidacy, not surprisingly, went
nowhere.

100

101

102
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Kyle Munzenrieder, Judge Jacqueline Schwartz Boasts about Defeating “Nondescript Hispanic,” MIAMI NEW
TIMES (Nov. 6, 2014), https://www.miaminewtimes.com/news/judge-jacqueline-schwartzboasts-about-defeating-nondescript-hispanic-6527336. As Kyle Munzenrieder quipped, “Finally,
a ray of light for the long-disenfranchised Anglo population in American politics … Wait, what?”
Id. As Munzenrieder goes on to observe: “Granted, some have complained that judicial candidates
with Hispanic last names tend to do better. Likely because, well, no one really pays that much
attention to judicial races and the county has a Hispanic majority. This is not something unique to
Miami-Dade. Some say the same could be said of judges with Jewish last names in Broward
County.” Id.
See e.g., Kent Russell, What Makes Florida So Weird? A Native Tries to Explain, N.Y. TIMES (July 19,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/24/books/review/oh-florida-craig-pittman.html
(reviewing a book that grew out of a series chronicling Florida’s “endemic absurdity”).
Evan Wyloge, Two-Time GOP Loser Changes Party to Democrat, Name to Cesar Chavez for New Congressional
Bid, ARIZ. CAPITOL TIMES (June 2, 2014), https://azcapitoltimes.com/news/2014/06/02/azrepublican-scott-fistler-changes-name-to-cesar-chavez-party-to-democrat-for-new-congressionalbid/. In the petition accompanying his legal request for a name change, the erstwhile Scott Fistler
explained that he had “experienced many hardships because of [his] name.” Id.
The Young Turks, Republican Pretends He’s a Democrat and That’s Not the Worst Part, YOUTUBE (June
3, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CUcYR2g6b5w.
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c. Passing in the Interest of Justice: Racial Fluidity and the Civil Rights
Movement
Of course, not all attempts at identity arbitrage are so cynical. In fact,
some constitute veritable acts of courage and sacrifice. On the streets of New
Orleans, Homer Plessy, the plaintiff in Plessy v. Ferguson, readily passed as a
white person since “the mixture of African blood [was] not discernable in
him.”104 In the opening brief of his Supreme Court case, his attorney, Albion
Tourgée, noted as much, claiming that Plessy’s ability to pass as white
constituted a protected property interest in the “reputation of being
white.”105 But when recruited for the purpose of bringing a lawsuit to
challenge the segregation, Plessy willingly embraced his blackness. Of
course, he did not do so for gain or to manipulate any system. But there was
a level of agency in his defiant act that brought the force of the state’s
discriminatory segregation regime upon him to confer him with legal
standing to challenge the constitutionality of the practice. Many AfricanAmericans living in the Jim Crow South had no choice, but Plessy did. Plessy
strategically racialized himself for the purposes of litigation in an attempt to
undo a vast injustice. Similarly, Walter White, an African-American
member of the NAACP, used his lighter features to pass as white and conduct
invaluable investigations into hate crimes in the Deep South during the early
part of the twentieth century.106
d. Racial Fluidity and the Alignment of Personal and Professional Interests:
Sliding Along the Racial Spectrum
The purpose and morality of racial arbitrage decisions typically lies
somewhere between the tactical ploys of elected officials looking for an
advantage at the voting booth and the noble work of Homer Plessy and
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CHARLES A. LOFGREN, THE PLESSY CASE 41 (1987) (citing the formal plea in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537 (1896)).
Brief for Plaintiff in Error, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (No. 210), 1893 WL 10660, at
*9 (arguing that “[p]robably most white persons if given a choice, would prefer death to life in the
United States as colored persons. Under these conditions, is it possible to conclude that the
reputation of being white is not property? Indeed, is it not the most valuable sort of property, being
the master-key that unlocks the golden door of opportunity?”) (emphasis omitted).
WALTER WHITE, A MAN CALLED WHITE: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF WALTER WHITE (1948).
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Walter White in exploiting their racial fluidity to fight for civil rights. More
often than not, in practice, exploitation of racial fluidity is just about
individuals attempting to align their interests and goals, both personal and
professional, with their sense of identity. Two examples from mid-twentiethcentury America illustrate this point while featuring opposite moves along
the racial spectrum.
The son of Welsh/Irish-American Samuel Stuart Williams and MexicanAmerican May Venzor, Theodore Samuel Williams was born in 1918 in the
North Park neighborhood of San Diego, less than twenty miles north of the
border. Williams concealed his non-white heritage and lived his public life
as a white man. More commonly known as Ted, he grew up to be one the
greatest baseball players of all-time.
Williams came to the majors during the time of the infamous
Gentleman’s Agreement, an implied compact amongst Major League
Baseball owners which rigidly patrolled color lines and altogether prevented
African-Americans from playing in the Big Leagues. Latinos did not fare
much better during the pre-integration era.107 So Williams said nary a word
about his Latino heritage until his playing days were long over.108 Instead,
with his Anglo name, he strategically passed as white. Williams’s choice
certainly assisted his professional goals109 and served his unflagging obsession
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As Adrian Burgos notes, “during the Jim Crow era (late 1880s to 1947) nearly all Latinos played in
the Negro leagues, not in the major leagues.” ADRIAN BURGOS, JR., PLAYING AMERICA’S GAME:
BASEBALL, LATINOS, AND THE COLOR LINE xiii (2007). By Burgos’ count, however, a total of fiftyfour Latino players broke into the Majors before baseball’s integration era started in 1947. Id. at 4.
Williams did not make his mother’s racial identity public until his 1970 autobiography, which came
out long after his playing days were over. See id. at 149. In it, Williams wrote: “if I had had my
mother’s name, there is no doubt I would have run into problems in those days, the prejudices
people had in Southern California.” TED WILLIAMS, MY TURN AT BAT 28 (1970).
While one might criticize Williams’s choice, it’s also worth noting that he was instrumental in
baseball’s latter-day recognition of the remarkable players from the Negro Leagues who never had
a chance to play Major League Baseball. In his 1966 Hall of Fame induction speech, Williams took
time to call for the celebration of the many great African-American baseball players who toiled
outside of the Big Show as a result of the era’s bigotry.
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to become (and, more pointedly, be known as) “the greatest hitter that ever
lived.”110
During the exact same era, another famous American chose to slide along
the racial spectrum in the opposite direction. Born in 1921, musician Johnny
Otis—one of the greatest band leaders and composers of the swing era—was
a Greek-American who grew up in an era of contested racialization for
individuals of Mediterranean descent.111 Raised in a largely AfricanAmerican community, he wrote in his autobiography that, “[a]s a kid I
decided that if our society dictated that one had to be black or white, I would
be black.”112 Otis thereafter thought of himself as “black by persuasion.”113
He used the term “we” when talking about African-Americans and he would
stay in “colored-only” hotels in the South while on tour with black
bandmates.114 He married a women of African and Filipino descent and
collaborated with predominantly African-American musicians in playing his
influential brand of rhythm and blues. Other musicians of the era made
similar choices—sometimes more surreptitiously. Little Julian Herrera was
a notable singer in the 1950s and popularly regard as the “first Chicano R&B
heartthrob.”115 But, it turned out, he was not Chicano at all. A brush with
the law revealed that he was actually one Robert Wayne Gregory, a
Caucasian of Hungarian Jewish extraction.116 Though the racial choices
made by Herrera and Otis came, no doubt, with heavy costs, they may well
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See TED WILLIAMS & JOHN UNDERWOOD, THE SCIENCE OF HITTING vi (Simon & Schuster, Inc.
1986) (1970).
Greek-Americans suffered from extensive discrimination during this time, though this is not to
suggest that the burdens of Jim Crow fell on them as harshly as it did on other groups, such as
African-Americans. See Tehranian, Compulsory Whiteness, supra note 3, at 9.
JOHNNY OTIS, LISTEN TO THE LAMBS xl (1968).
Id. at xi.
See John Blake, The Blurring of Racial Lines Won’t Save America. Why ‘Racial Fluidity’ is a Con, CNN (June
11, 2018, 1:23 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/02/us/racial-fluidity/index.html (describing
Otis’s tendencies to stay with black bandmates while on tour).
Bob Carlson, Little Julian’s Secret, KCRW: UNFICTIONAL (May 23, 2014),
https://www.kcrw.com/culture/shows/unfictional/little-julians-secret.
See 9 BEYOND ALLIANCES: THE JEWISH ROLE IN RESHAPING THE RACIAL LANDSCAPE OF
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA (Bruce Zuckerman et al. eds., 2012) (noting that Julian Herrera was
actually born Ron Gregory).
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have served certain professional interests, particularly when one can surmise
that, in the worlds of Chicano music and rhythm and blues, they may have
enjoyed some advantages for adopting the racial identity of the dominant
players in the genres.117
2. Racial Fluidity and Its Limits
Individuals therefore exercise some level of choice over their racial
identification and do so based on a variety of conscious and unconscious
motivations. This freedom to choose is tacitly acknowledged, if not
encouraged, by a number of bureaucratic policies.118 Despite the widespread
availability of DNA testing, for example, there are no blood quotient
requirements to determine race at law (at least not anymore).119 Since 1960,
the Census has left it up to individuals themselves to declare their own race;120
the Census merely gives some guidance and then allows people to check the
box of their own choosing. On other government forms that individuals fill
out themselves, individuals are usually free to self-designate without strict
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One may also fairly question whether both Otis’s and Herrera’s gambits also involved the exertion
of white privilege—the ability to become a racial minority when convenience serves while retaining
the option of being white at any time. Although racial fluidity—if possessed by all, on equal terms—
may not inherently possess a valence, there is evidence to suggest that moving from white to nonwhite may be far easier than the other way around. See infra Part I.B.2 (discussing the limits of racial
fluidity).
For all of the judicial solicitude to the concept of race as immutable, the government’s bureaucratic
deference to self-selection of race appears to acknowledge at least some level of agency in the
identification process.
A remaining exception to this general proposition is blood quotient requirements for recognition in
certain Native American tribes—a requirement that, at first blush, appears at tension with the
notion that Native American status is legally deemed to be a political designation, not a racial one.
See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) (holding that Native American is a political, rather
than racial, classification and therefore not subject to heightened equal protection scrutiny).
See, Helen Hatab Samhan, Not Quite White: Race Classification and the Arab-American Experience, in ARABS
IN AMERICA: BUILDING A NEW FUTURE 209, 215 (Michael W. Suleiman ed., 1999) (linking the
concept of self-enumeration as a census policy to the shift, in the 1960s, to a mailed census); MARGO
J. ANDERSON, THE AMERICAN CENSUS: A SOCIAL HISTORY 201 (1988) (noting that the 1960
census differed from its predecessors by asking respondents to self-identify their race). Prior to 1960,
official Census Interviewers would mark race based on their perception of the individuals they were
surveying.
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rules.121 Thus, when Nikki Haley—who would later go on to be the first
Indian-American woman elected to the governorship of any state—showed
up to register to vote in South Carolina in 2001, she designated herself as
‘white.’122 When she speaks in public, however, she often identifies herself as
a member of a racial minority.123 Of course, it is impossible to know the
reasons for her ‘white’ self-designation in her voting paperwork, but one
cannot help but wonder if it reflected an unconscious cognizance of the
centuries-long efforts to suppress, if not outright deny, the non-white vote.
To be sure, the freedom to choose one’s race only goes so far. Society
may push back and, with its interventions, strongly curb the ability of an
individual to actually practice a particular self-identification. After all,
society has shown little interest in accepting Rachel Dolezal’s self-designation
as black124 or Elizabeth Warren’s self-designation as Native American.125
And when a Nazi skinhead is beating up an individual of Middle Eastern
descent, discussions about their shared Aryan roots (in the “dim reaches of
antiquity”126), Blumenbach’s skull collection,127 and the Mesopotamian
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Directive 15 of the Office of Management and Budget, revised in 1997, strongly encouraged racedata collection efforts to focus on enabling individuals to select their own racial status and formally
asserted that self-identification was “the preferred means of obtaining information about an
individual’s race and ethnicity.” See Revisions to the Standards for the Classification of Federal
Data on Race and Ethnicity, 62 Fed. Reg. 58,782, 58,785 (Oct. 30, 1997).
Siddhartha Mahanta, Indian Nikki Haley Says She Is White, MOTHER JONES (July 29, 2011),
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2011/07/indian-nikki-haley-says-she-is-white/.
See, e.g., Jelani Cobb, The Complicated History of Nikki Haley, NEW YORKER (Jan. 13, 2016) (noting that
Haley has publicly referenced “the prejudices she encountered as part of the only Sikh family in
Bamberg, South Carolina, which was ‘not white enough to be white, not black enough to be
black.’”).
Orbe, supra note 28, at 35 (noting that Dolezal’s identification as African-American was “largely
rejected” by popular opinion).
Linskey & Gardner, supra note 29 (noting that Warren apologized for her identification after “she
took [a DNA test] to demonstrate her purported heritage, a move that prompted a ferocious
backlash even from many allies.”).
United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 209 (1923).
Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, the father of the pseudoscience of phrenology, famously classified
humanity into four races. He deemed his favorite (the white, or Caucasian, race) after the most
prize skull in his collection—that of a woman from the caucuses—that he deemed most
harmoniously proportioned. See supra note 4.
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origins of western civilization are not going to move the needle. Racial
belonging can be imposed, sometimes with lethal force. At the same time,
however, a growing body of evidence has revealed a surprisingly high level
of agency in the process of racialization. This empirical work also suggests
that factors other than mere passing or covering are at play in the process.
3. Capturing Racial Fluidity Rates: The Growing Body of Empirical Research
The enterprise of determining variance rates in racialization is,
admittedly, fraught with uncertainty. However, an emerging empirical
literature in the social sciences has begun to indicate that such rates may be
more robust than previously thought. The unwitting results produced from
a decades-long U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics longitudinal study that began
in 1979 provide surprising support for this view. In the study, the Bureau
traced the economic histories of 12,686 (initially) young men and women
through the years.128 Later, as two sociologists, Aliya Saperstein and Andrew
M. Penner, evaluated the study’s data, they found something quite
unexpected: peoples’ races were changing over time.129 In other words, the very
same individuals were being coded as different races over different reporting
periods (either annual or biennial) by the survey interviewers. As Saperstein
and Penner noted, despite all the rhetoric about race as a social construction,
sociological studies almost universally take race as a given input130 and
situations involving the malleability of race are generally assumed to be
outliers, limited to individuals falling into one of three circumstances:
(1) a small minority of present-day Americans with widely recognized mixed
ancestries, such as Latinos, American Indians, and the children of the post1960s “biracial baby boom”; (2) macro level changes in social hierarchies
that marked historical epochs in the United States, such as the early 20th
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National
Longitudinal
Surveys:
NLSY79,
BUREAU
OF
LABOR
STATISTICS,
https://www.bls.gov/nls/nlsy79.htm (last updated June 25, 2003).
Aliya Saperstein & Andrew M. Penner, Racial Fluidity and Inequality in the United States, 118 AM. J.
SOC. 678 (2012).
Id. at 680 (“Qualitative researchers also often, if inadvertently, treat membership in any given racial
population as an underlying fixed characteristic.”) (citation omitted).
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century ‘whitening’ of southern and eastern Europeans; or (3) places with a
high degree of racial mixing, such as Brazil. 131

Yet the survey studied by Saperstein and Penner suggested that we have
significantly underestimated the breadth of race malleability. Specifically, in
a whopping 20% of instances, the reported race of a given surveyed individual
changed at least once between 1979 and 1998.132
All the while, there were some disturbing tendencies associated with the
pattern of change. As subjects suffered lower social status (through
incarceration, unemployment, divorce, or poverty), they became blacker in
the interviewers’ eyes. As they gained social status, interviewers viewed them
as whiter. For example:
•

•

•

Individual 9372 had been categorized as “other” three times while
employed (i.e., “black” 0% of the time).133 After unemployment, this
individual was categorized as “black” 13 out of 14 times (i.e., “black:
93% of the time).134
Individual 9969 was classified as “white” 11 of 11 times while employed
(i.e., “white” 100% of the time).135 After unemployment, this individual
was categorized as “other” 4 out of 6 times (i.e., “white” just 33% of the
time).136
Individual 9266 was classified as “white” 3 out of 4 times during
employment (i.e., “white” 75% of the time)137 After unemployment, this
individual was categorized as “black” or other 10 out of 11 times (i.e.,
“white” just 9% of the time).138

The participants clearly “enjoyed” racial fluidity. But this was no cause
for celebration. The changes were intricately tied to social status, something
about which individuals have only a limited level of control. More
troublingly, the linking of social status to race only further accentuates
damaging racial stereotypes, building them like an avalanche since those who
defy them effectively get moved out of the very racial category that allegedly

131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138

Id. at 677.
Sometimes these changes would persist; other times, people would eventually return to their
originally designated race. Id. at 688.
Id. at 706.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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embodies such traits. As such, while racial identities may be more fluid at
the individual level, racial categories and associated prejudices at the macro
level may only be hardening in our societal structure.
The Saperstein and Penner study showed shifting external identifications
of race based on changing socioeconomic indicia for the racialized
individuals. However, changes in race also occur in terms of selfidentification. A comprehensive review of Census data found that nearly ten
million Americans responded differently when asked about their race or
Hispanic origin in the 2000 Census versus the 2010 Census, even though the
categories for both surveys remained largely the same.139
Meanwhile, in another recent study, political scientist Patrick Egan found
that ostensibly stable identities such as race and sexual orientation changed
over time in response to political opinions.140 Using three waves of General
Social Survey data and controlling for other changes, he found that
individuals actually morph key group identities to better conform with
prototypical demographics associated with their political ideology. For
example, his data showed that individuals who are liberal Democrats tend to
become “more” Hispanic over time—meaning that they shift their racial
identification to better match the perceived demographics of their political
identity—and conservative Republicans tend to become “less” Hispanic over
time.141 As Egan concludes:
[T]he highly salient nature of political identities in contemporary U.S.
politics can lead them to supersede other identities we typically think of as
fixed, and thus counter-intuitively causing these identities to change to better
align with partisan and ideological prototypes . . . Conservative Republicans
are more likely than liberal Democrats to shift into identification as born-

139

140

141

Carolyn A. Libeler et al., American’s Churning Races: Race and Ethnic Response Changes Between Census
2000 and the 2010 Census 3–4 (Ctr. for Admin. Records Research and Applications, Working Paper
No. 2014-09, 2014), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/working-papers/
2014/adrm/carra-wp-2014-09.pdf.
Egan, supra note 77, at 2 (hypothesizing that “the highly salient nature of political identities in
contemporary U.S. politics can lead them to supersede other identities we typically think of as fixed,
and thus counter-intuitively causing these identities to change to better align with partisan and
ideological prototypes”).
Id. at 17–18.
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again Christian, Protestant, and national origins associated with being nonHispanic white. Liberal Democrats are more likely than conservative
Republicans to shift into identification as lesbian, gay or bisexual, having no
religion, and being of Latino origin.142

C. Racial Fluidity in Practice: A Case Study of Kim Kardashian
None other than the most ubiquitous celebrity of our generation, Kim
Kardashian, illustrates the process of racial mutability in action and
highlights the role that both society and individuals play in racial
hermeneutics. Journalist Erin Keane once quipped that, “Like a round,
shiny mirror, [Kim] Kardashian’s butt reflects back to us our myriad cultural
panics and anxieties, inviting us to oil them up and present them to the
world.”143 It should therefore come as no surprise that, even on the issue of
race, Kim Kardashian and her backside have relevance.
Kardashian’s racial identity has long been the subject of attention,
interest, and speculation. The way in which it is shaped implicates both the
first and second iterations of mutability. Part of Kardashian’s racial identity
remains wholly out of her control, but is subject to change and is therefore
mutable nonetheless. As we have already detailed, by historical standards
that prized Anglo-Saxon stock, as an individual of Armenian descent,144
Kardashian was decidedly not white. But then again, consider this: neither
are most of you.
From a modern legal point of view, and in contrast to the historical view,
Kim is undoubtedly white. Her descendants literally trace their origins to
the Caucasus Mountains, the site of ethnologist Johann Friedrich
Blumenbach’s favorite skull. And, according to the Federal Government,
anyone of European, Middle Eastern, or North African descent is defined as
white by law. Of course, under this precedent, Winston Churchill, Adolf
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Id.
Erin Keane, All the Things We Project onto Kim Kardashian’s Butt: How One Woman’s Rear-End Came to
Mean Everything, SALON.COM (Nov. 12, 2014), https://www.salon.com/test/2014/11/12/
all_the_things_we_project_onto_kim_kardashians_butt_how_one_womans_rear_end_came_to_
mean_everything.
For the purposes of this analysis, we are considering just Kardashian’s Armenian heritage.
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Hitler, Paris Hilton, Saddam Hussein, Muammar Gaddafi, and Kim
Kardashian are all deemed white by law.
At the same time, in some ways, Armenian-Americans have been
growing decidedly less white in the past two decades. Specifically, the law’s
(purported) precision belies the inherent instability of social constructions of
race. To put it bluntly, in the post-9/11 world, when individuals of Middle
Eastern descent are at the airport, they are not white. When individuals of
Middle Eastern descent are accused of a crime, they are not white. And
while Steve Jobs (a Syrian-American145) might be just another white male
CEO, Ralph Nader (Lebanese-American146) another white politician, and
Andre Agassi (Iranian-American147) another white tennis player, no one calls
Osama bin Laden, Saddam Hussein, Nidal Hassan or Syed Farook white.
Moreover, with the creation of the MENA category, individuals of Armenian
descent may be finding themselves officially changing race.148 With these
realties in mind, Kim Kardashian may be legally white for now, but perhaps
not for much longer. Racial definitions continue to be fluid, even to this
day—and not just by law (i.e., what the Federal Government ultimately
decides to do with the proposed MENA category) but also in social
perception.
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See Steve Jobs: Adopted Child Who Never Met His Biological Father, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 6, 2011, 4:00 PM
BST), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/steve-jobs/8811345/Steve-Jobs-adopted-childwho-never-met-his-biological-father.html (noting that Steve’s biological father, Abdulfattah
Jandali, was a Syrian immigrant).
See CRONIN MARCELLO, RALPH NADER: A BIOGRAPHY (2004) (noting that Nader was the son of
Lebanese immigrants and even spent a portion of his childhood living in Lebanon).
DOMINIC COBELLO, MIKE AGASSI & KATE SHOUP WELSH, THE AGASSI STORY (2008) (noting
that Agassi’s father, Mike, “was born in Persia – later called Iran – in 1930 to Armenian parents”
and later emigrated to the United States).
Whether Armenians count in the MENA category is still up in the air. But the country of Armenia
abuts the geographic area often referred to as the Middle East and many Armenians have
historically populated the region. The Armenian diaspora is particularly large in such countries as
Iran, Lebanon, and Syria, especially in the wake of the genocide it suffered last century. However,
Armenians were not listed in the initial draft of the classification.
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But, perhaps most importantly, Kardashian also plays a role in how she
is racialized. Whether consciously or not, she wields a level of control in the
process herself. In some contexts—when she talks about her experience
raising a “bi-racial” child and witnessing, for the first time, racism and
discrimination149—she very much plays white. She grew up wealthy and
privileged and her mother, Kris, is popularly perceived of as white. In other
contexts—for example, when she ‘breaks the Internet’150 and monetizes her
assets by presenting herself a bold and ‘exotic’ vision of beauty that stands in
stark contrast to the waifish Anglo-Saxon blonde traditionally embraced by
the fashion industry151—she plays ‘ethnic.’ To some, she even enjoys
‘honorary black’ status in the African-American community. With the (half)
Armenian heritage that shapes her phenotype, her looks (the purported
hallmark of common understandings of race) and aspects of how she presents
herself (an underappreciated factor that impacts people’s perceptions of
race), she might be viewed as non-white. In short, the single best word to
capture the reality of Kardashian’s racial identity is fluid; over time and in
different contexts, she has occupied numerous spots along the American
racial spectrum.

149

150

151

See,
e.g.,
Kim
Kardashian,
On
My
Mind,
CELEBUZZ
(May
7,
2014),
http://kimkardashian.celebuzz.com/2014/05/07/on-my-mind/
[https://perma.cc/9RVQR39D] (“To be honest, before I had North [her son with Kanye West], I never really gave racism or
discrimination a lot of thought. It is obviously a topic that Kanye is passionate about, but I guess it
was easier for me to believe that it was someone else’s battle. But recently, I’ve read and personally
experienced some incidents that have sickened me and made me take notice. I realize that racism and
discrimination are still alive, and just as hateful and deadly as they ever have been.”).
See, e.g., David Hershkovits, How Kim Kardashian Broke the Internet with Her Butt, GUARDIAN (Dec. 17,
2014), https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2014/dec/17/kim-kardashian-butt-break-theinternet-paper-magazine (positing that “Paper magazine’s winter issue, with the cover shot of Kim
Kardashian by Jean-Paul Goude, set out to #BreakTheInternet”).
See, e.g., Savannah Munoz, Kim Kardashian and the Politics (and Privilege) of Being Racially Ambiguous,
SUBSTANCE.MEDIA (Feb. 22, 2018), https://substance.media/kim-kardashian-and-the-politicsand-privilege-of-being-racially-ambiguous-bfa9cf1a2636 (arguing that Kardashian’s “body’s racial
ambiguity allows her to move between her own whiteness and shallowly associate herself with people
of color when she needs to be cool, relevant and ‘ethnic.’ Rather than genuinely engage with
communities of color, Kim K morphs her body into any race and/or ethnicity she pleases.
She’s Black when she needs publicity and relevance, Armenian when she needs to be ‘ethnic,’ and
white when shit starts getting real.”).
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II. IMMUTABILITY AND ITS DISCONTENTS
As Part I has demonstrated, race is far from immutable. Yet,
paradoxically, its purported immutability lies at the very heart of our equalprotection jurisprudence. Part II explores the consequences of the
dichotomy between the legal fiction of racial immutability and the practical
reality of racial fluidity. To begin, we examine the curious, accidental history
of how immutability made its way into equal-protection doctrine in the first
place. We then build on this history by assessing the impact of the
immutability factor on the development of juridical respect for the dignitary
interests of minority groups that come under the scope of its protection.
Using the Supreme Court’s evolving jurisprudence on sexual orientation as
an example, we argue that, although the rooting of protection on the
purported immutability of a trait may make sense in achieving early judicial
tolerance for the targeted group, the fetishization of immutability ultimately
impedes the fight against subordination and the achievement of a meaningful
social equality that is grounded in acceptance.
A. The Accidental Elevation of Immutability in Equal-Protection Jurisprudence
One of the strangest aspects of immutability’s doctrinal history is the fact
that it had no formal role in the Supreme Court’s constitutional
jurisprudence until 1973, when it made its way into the argot of equalprotection law with Frontiero v. Richardson,152 the first case in which the
Supreme Court recognized heightened scrutiny of gender-based
classifications. Prior to that time, immutability was not a consideration in
the juridical calculus for identifying suspect classes. It is not surprising that
the issue of immutability did not come up with respect to cases involving
African-Americans. After all, although the Court often issued troubling
interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause, there was little question that
the Fourteenth Amendment applied to laws targeting blacks. But, it is worth
noting that, once the Supreme Court finally expanded equal protection to
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Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973).
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laws pertaining to any race, it continued to say nothing about immutability
as a factor in its rationale.153 If anything, the Court justified its decision to
expand heightened scrutiny to all racial classifications (not just those
pertaining to African-Americans) by an appeal not to the immutability of
race, but to the mutability of racism:
Throughout our history, differences in race and color have defined easily
identifiable groups which have at times required the aid of the courts in
securing equal treatment under the laws. But community prejudices are not
static, and, from time to time, other differences from the community norm
may define other groups which need the same protection.154

When the Supreme Court subsequently widened its interpretation of the
Equal Protection Clause beyond merely race-based distinctions,
immutability played no role in that decision either, at least initially. For
example, the Court made no mention of immutability when it extended
heightened scrutiny to alienage classifications for the purposes of equalprotection analysis with its decision in Graham v. Richardson.155 Instead, Graham
simply considered whether aliens should enjoy “heightened judicial
solicitude”156 when courts review laws that singled them out, because they,
like members of non-white races, constituted “discrete and insular”
minorities per footnote four of Carolene Products.157 Similarly, when the
Supreme Court suggested that illegitimacy might constitute a suspect
category, it also eschewed any consideration of immutability. Instead,
quoting King Lear, the Court noted that, just like classifications based on race,
those relating to legitimacy reflected a long history of discrimination
grounded in nothing more than naked animus..158 As the Court further
posited, legitimacy classifications violated fundamental norms of fairness
because “imposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic
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See Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
Id. at 478.
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
Id. at 372.
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938).
Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71, 72 (1968) (positing that the Court has “not hesitated to strike
down an invidious classification even though it had history and tradition on its side” and citing to
Brown v Board of Education).
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concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to
individual responsibility or wrongdoing. Obviously, no child is responsible
for his birth and penalizing the illegitimate child is an ineffectual—as well as
an unjust—way of deterring the parent.”159 Thus, it was not so much the
immutable nature of one’s birth status that triggered heightened scrutiny but,
rather, the absence of a link between use of the classification and any
meaningful merit.
But when the Supreme Court finally expanded its reading of the Equal
Protection Clause to include classifications based on gender in 1973,
immutability suddenly appeared as a valuable heuristic. To understand this
unexpected move, it is helpful to take a step back and appreciate the
challenges facing the application of equal protection to gender classifications.
First, from a textualist point of view, the Fourteenth Amendment says
nothing expressly about gender.160 Second, from an originalist point of view,
its immediate purpose, in the eyes of those who enacted it during
Reconstruction, related to the (newly emancipated) African-American
population. As such, at the early stages of its invocation, the Supreme Court
deemed the Equal Protection Clause to apply to classifications involving
African-Americans alone.161 It was not until 1954, with Hernandez v. Texas,
that the Court expressly held that any racial classification by the government
was subject to equal-protection scrutiny.162 Third, and perhaps most
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160

161

162

Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 177 (1972).
At the same time, unlike the Fifteenth Amendment, which expressly limits its application to race,
the Equal Protection Clause does not expressly do so, thereby leaving it open as to what equal
protection means and to what classifications it might particularly pertain. See Alexander M.
Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1955).
See The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1873) (“the clause which forbids a State
to deny to any person the equal protection of the laws was clearly intended to prevent the hostile
discrimination against the negro race so familiar in the States where he had been a slave, and, for
this purpose, the clause confers ample power in Congress to secure his rights and his equality before
the law.”)
See Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 477–78 (1954) (“The State of Texas would have us hold
that there are only two classes—white and Negro—within the contemplation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. . . . But . . . [w]hen the existence of a distinct class is demonstrated, and it is further
shown that the laws, as written or as applied, single out that class for different treatment not based
on some reasonable classification, the guarantees of the Constitution have been violated. The
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problematically, the Court had to overcome the fact that, unlike
discrimination on the basis of other recognized suspect categories such as
race, national origin, legitimacy or alienage, the typical victims of gender
discrimination—women—were not, at least numerically and post-suffrage, a
“discrete and insular minority”163 without any ability to turn to majoritarian
political processes for redresses of grievances.
Within this context, the Frontiero Court needed grounds beyond the failure
of the political process164 to warrant extension of heightened scrutiny to
gender issues. So the Court analogized gender to race in other ways. The
long and shared history of irrational and unjustifiable discrimination on the
basis of both race and gender helped advance the argument for suspect-class
status. More importantly, for our purposes, the Court latched on to the
concept of immutability, which both classifications seemed to share. In the
process, the Court made immutability one of the key factors considered by
courts in determining whether a trait is subject to heightened scrutiny under

163
164

Fourteenth Amendment is not directed solely against discrimination due to a ‘two-class theory’—
that is, based upon differences between ‘white’ and Negro.”). The march towards Hernandez’s overt
adoption of this broader reading of the Equal Protection Clause began with Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356 (1886) (holding that discriminatory enforcement of San Francisco’s permitting
requirement for certain types of laundry services constituted a violation of the equal protection
rights of individuals of Chinese descent).
Donald Braman, Of Race and Immutability, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1375, 1452 (1999) (quoting Frontiero
oral arguments and their referencing of footnote four from Carolene Products).
It is worth noting, however, that the political process had failed women, and numerous
discriminatory laws and policies grounded in gender bias and outmoded notions of proper gender
roles have been enacted even though women represent the majority of the electorate. See, e.g.,
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685–86 (1973) (noting that, even though “the position of
women in America has improved markedly in recently decades . . . women still face pervasive,
although at times more subtle, discrimination”). Furthermore, although the numbers are getting
better, women continue to constitute only a disproportionately small minority of elected officials.
See, e.g., Danielle Kurtzleben, Almost 1 in 5 Congress Members Are Women, NPR (June 11, 2016, 6:00
AM), https://www.npr.org/2016/06/11/481424890/even-with-a-female-presumptive-nomineewomen-are-underrepresented-in-politics (noting that, as of 2016, women constituted only 24.5% of
state legislators, 19.4% of Members of Congress, and 12% of governors).

November 2019]

CHANGING RACE

45

the Equal Protection Clause.165 And it did so by drawing on prior legal
commentary rather than legal precedent.
Specifically, as Donald Braman has traced,166 it was not a court opinion
but the 1969 series on Developments in the Law published by the Harvard Law
Review (“HLR”) that first linked immutability and equal protection in the legal
discourse.167 In its influential commentary, the HLR Editorial Board sought
to reconcile the extant equal-protection jurisprudence at the time. In an
attempt to rationalize instances where the courts would subject legislative
action to heightened scrutiny with those in which they declined to do so, the
authors drew a distinction between definitions of status linked to merit and
those that are not. According to the Editors, immutability served as a
common thread unifying classifications in the latter category (such as race
and national origin). Frontiero built on this logic, expressly citing to the HLR’s
commentary in suggesting that “sex, like race and national origin, is an
immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth”168 and,
as such, differentiation based on gender is generally without merit. As a
result, Frontiero held that distinctions based on gender would face heightened
scrutiny169 since the “most stringent level of [judicial review]” applied to
governmental distinctions drawn on the basis of immutable traits.170
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Courts also consider a history of discrimination against the group, the lack of any link between the
group’s trait and ability to perform or contribute to society, and political powerlessness of the group.
See, e.g., Whitewood v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d. 410 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (summarizing the extant
jurisprudence establishing the four factors to determine heightened scrutiny).
Braman, supra note 163, at 1447–48.
Developments in the Law—Equal Protection (The Concept of Equality: The View from a Wide Perspective), 82
HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1969).
Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686.
Ultimately, of course, the Court arrived at application of intermediate, rather than strict, scrutiny
to gender-based classifications. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (“[C]lassifications by
gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives.”). But see United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996)
(requiring that the government provide an “exceedingly persuasive justifications” for any
discrimination on the basis of gender).
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 496 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring).
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In the years following Frontiero, the decision’s immutability language
caught on and, in future encapsulations of the Court’s equal-protection
jurisprudence, it would take center-stage. As the Court would opine only a
few years later in Fullilove v. Kluznick, a remedial race benefits case decided in
1980, “Racial classifications must be assessed under the most stringent level
of review because immutable characteristics, which bear no relation to
individual merit or need, are irrelevant to almost every governmental
decision.”171 Curiously, the Court’s citation for this proposition, Anderson v.
Martin,172 was a race-related case that made no mention of immutability at
all.173 Similarly, in Parham v. Hughes, an illegitimacy case decided in 1979, the
Court concluded that “[T]he [ordinary] presumption of statutory validity
may also be undermined [on equal protection grounds] when a State has
enacted legislation creating classes based upon certain…immutable human
attributes.”174 To support this proposition, the Court cited to both alienage
and legitimacy cases decided prior to Frontiero—cases that also made no
mention of immutability as a consideration.175 Immutability, despite its
previous absence from constitutional jurisprudence, had now become an
entrenched part of the equal-protection calculus—even though the
integration was accomplished accidentally, at best (or, more cynically,
through judicial legerdemain).
B. From Tolerance to Acceptance: Immutability and the Realization of a More Robust
Equal-Protection Doctrine
The uncritical introduction of immutability into the equal-protection
calculus is not, by itself, reason enough to do away with the factor. After all,
there may be good reason and utility behind the concept, even if it were
introduced so haphazardly and adopted disingenuously, without careful
consideration. But, as we shall see, there are significant reasons to question
the continued use of the immutability heuristic.
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Id.
375 U.S. 399 (1964).
See id. at 402–404.
Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 351 (1979).
Id. at 351 (citing Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) and Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365
(1971)).
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At the outset, the immutability assumption simply does not reflect reality.
For example, gender is no longer viewed as immutable. A society-wide sea
change has taken place in recent years, as we have increasingly recognized
(albeit with pushback) gender fluidity. Gender is now viewed as a prime
malleable component of identity. To give a single random example, Harvard
University’s Registrar’s Office has a standardized form for students and
alumni to fill out for changes in their official documentation. It allows
modification along just three metrics: name, marital status, and gender.176
Indeed, an entire bureaucratic infrastructure has begun to develop to show
respect for, and give a voice and recognition to, gender fluidity, by, inter alia,
facilitating changes of gender on passports and driver’s licenses.177 Of course,
as the Trump administration’s ban on transgender service members178
indicates, there is still a great deal of work to do to achieve full protection for
the rights of the transgendered. But, despite some retrenchment, both
federal and state protections of gender identity have expanded notably over
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Name and/or Gender Change Request Form, HARV. UNIV. FAC. ARTS & SCI. REGISTRAR’S OFFICE,
https://registrar.fas.harvard.edu/files/fas-registrar/files/name_and_gender_change_request_
form.pdf (last updated June 2018).
The Federal Government allows changes to passports, and most states now allow changes for
driver’s licenses and other records. Change of Sex Marker, BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S.
DEP’T OF STATE, https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/passports/apply-renew-passport/
change-of-sex-marker.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2019); see, e.g., Laurel Wamsley, Oregon Adds A New
Gender Option To Its Driver’s Licenses: X, NPR (June 16, 2017, 12:36 PM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/06/16/533207483/oregon-adds-a-newgender-option-to-its-driver-s-licenses-x?t=1568381169656.
Memorandum from President Donald J. Trump, to James Mattis, Sec’y of Def., U.S. Dep’t of Def.,
and Elaine Duke, Acting Sec’y of Homeland Sec., U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., on Military
Service by Transgender Individuals, 2017 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 587 (Aug. 25, 2017)
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201700587/pdf/DCPD-201700587.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF
DEF., REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON MILITARY SERVICE BY TRANSGENDER PERSONS
(2018), https://media.defense.gov/2018/Mar/23/2001894037/-1/-1/0/MILITARY-SERVIC
E-BY-TRANSGENDER-INDIVIDUALS.PDF.
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the past decade.179 And, as our analysis has shown,180 race is also not
immutable.181 Thus, the key traits deemed immutable by the courts are not
immutable after all.
Yet there is good reason to continue to protect both race and gender with
heightened scrutiny. So, if it is not their immutability that warrants such
protection, we must reasonably ask what it is about characteristics such as
race and gender that justifies the Courts’ presumption that laws drawing
distinctions based on them are invalid. When cast in this light, we see that
equal protection is fundamentally about the preservation of fairness and the
counter-majoritarian check that judicial review provides against laws borne
of irrational prejudice.
Even without considering the mutability of race and gender,
immutability’s role in Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence has not been
without controversy. John Hart Ely, for one, strongly questioned reliance on
the factor in noting that regulations pertaining to immutable characteristics,
such as intelligence or physical disability, are not usually subject to
heightened scrutiny: “The explanation, when one is given, is
that those characteristics (unlike the one the commentator is trying to render
suspect) are often relevant to legitimate purposes. At that point there’s not
much left of the immutability theory, is there?”182 Taking Ely’s point a step
further, Janet Halley has observed183 that, although the Supreme Court has
rejected heightened scrutiny for immutable characteristics such as
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See, e.g., Transgender Rights, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/lgbt-rights/transgender-rights (last
visited Aug. 24, 2019) (documenting the judicial holdings and legislation that have widened the
scope of protection given to transgender individuals from, inter alia, hate crimes, housing and
employment discrimination, and harassment).
See supra Part I.
However, it is worth noting that society appears to be far less accepting of racial fluidity than gender
fluidity. We shall examine this phenomenon infra.
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 150 (1980).
Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection for Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Identity,
36 UCLA L. REV. 915, 926 (1989).
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disability,184 it has applied heightened scrutiny to mutable characteristics
such as alienage.185 Halley has therefore posited that “immutability is neither
a necessary nor a sufficient precondition for the recognition of a suspect
classification, and where it has appeared as a factor in the Court’s analysis, it
has always been shorthand for inquiry into the fairness of the political process
burdening the group.”186
Meanwhile, as Jessica Clarke has argued, the emphasis on immutability
has distracted from the proper task of anti-discrimination laws, which should
be targeting systemic and unreasonable forms of bias.187 Indeed, use of
immutability as an attempted proxy for fairness comes with significant
problems. It may be true that, as a normative matter, we should not allow,
or at least should strictly scrutinize, laws differentiating amongst people on
the basis of traits which they cannot control. But our entire society is based
on precisely that kind of differentiation. Whether rightfully or not, the postWestphalian notion of the nation-state and the meaningful enforcement of
borders and immigration laws seem to require disparate treatment of people
on the basis of whether they happened, by the lottery of birth, to be born to
a family with citizenship or on domestic soil. Meanwhile, the entire premise
of capitalism is based upon solicitude to economic productivity and
efficiency, thereby mandating discrimination on the basis of mental and
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See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1981) (declining to extend
suspect class status to individual suffering from mental disabilities, despite the immutability of such
disabilities).
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371–72 (1971) (extending strict scrutiny to alienage
classifications). While alienage is not formally an immutable status (after all, legal status can
change), it is oftentimes an accident of birth (i.e., whether one is born in the United States (or to
United States citizen parents) or not). In addition, while alienage has been theoretically deemed a
suspect class, the Court has enunciated two critical exceptions to that rule (when the classification
serves purposes of democratic self-governance, see Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 296–97 (1978),
or when it serves federal plenary power in matters related to foreign policy and immigration, see
Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79–80 (1976)). In practice, these exceptions have threatened to
swallow up the general rule and significantly limited the application of heightened scrutiny to
alienage.
See Halley, supra note 183, at 926.
Jessica A. Clarke, Against Immutability, 125 YALE L.J. 2, 101 (2015).
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physical abilities in many contexts, regardless of whether these characteristics
are immutable (and, in at least some cases, they indisputably are).
At a minimum, therefore, the Court’s fetishization of immutability lacks
analytical rigor. In Frontiero (and other cases involving suspect classifications),
the Court asserted that distinguishing between individuals on the basis of
certain accidents of birth lacked inherent merit. In the process, the Court
conflated the concept of immutability with accidents of birth.188 But, of
course, many accidents of birth (socioeconomic status, alienage, linguistic
ability) are mutable. And while we believe some accidents of birth constitute
unfair means by which to judge a person, we believe other accidents of birth
(such as mental aptitude and physical abilities) form a perfectly sound basis
to draw legal distinctions. As a result, it is not really immutable traits that
equal protection seems to protect. Rather, it is distinctions that lack (or
almost always lack) merit (of which certain accidents of birth are a
subspecies). Thus, it is fairness that actually lies at the heart of equal
protection, and heightened scrutiny therefore attaches when there is good
reason to suspect that a particular classification arises not from sound public
policy but, rather, from irrational prejudice, bias, or even animus.189
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Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (“[S]ince sex, like race and national origin, is an
immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth, the imposition of special
disabilities upon the members of a particular sex because of their sex would seem to violate ‘the
basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual
responsibility. . . .’”) (citing Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972)).
Such a formulation of equal protection makes eminent sense when one considers that race is the
original suspect classification and that immutability only entered the equal-protection lexicon as a
result of the need to analogize other traits to race. Viewed in this light, immutability is only, at best,
a heuristic tool (and an imprecise one at that) for determining what categories besides race deserve
heightened scrutiny. And, with respect to race, it should be viewed as an irrelevant consideration,
as it was never intended to be one in the first place. With that in mind, protection of traits intricately
related to race should not be diminished on mutability grounds. Indeed, the focus on immutability
turns race-related jurisprudence on its head. After all, even the most constrained reading of the
Fourteenth Amendment would concede that the Equal Protection Clause applies to race. Thus, it
is not logical to state that the Fourteenth Amendment protects against discrimination on the basis
of immutable traits and, since race is immutable, race is protected. Rather, the Fourteenth
Amendment protects against discrimination on the basis of race and, since immutability was
(mistakenly) deemed to be a critical component of race, purportedly immutable traits outside of
race received protection.
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As such, decoupling immutability from the equal-protection calculus
should cause us to view legislation targeting suspect classes in a different light.
If equal protection is not about protecting us from discrimination on the basis
of birth traits, it is about the protection of suspect-class-related identity traits
(whether the product of birth or otherwise) that have no link to merit but
have been the subject of historical targeting as a result of animus or bias.
Since race has strong performative elements and race can change (sometimes
with individual choice, sometimes without), the decisions associated with that
change should properly come under the scope of equal protection. Yet our
equal-protection jurisprudence has rarely been read so capaciously. Courts
have consistently embraced the immutability factor as a mechanism to deny
protection to such traits as hairstyle and language on the grounds that such
characteristics are mutable; but, in fact, such characteristics are part and
parcel of the performance of race. An exegesis of relevant case jurisprudence
on matters such as language and hairstyle demonstrates the way in which the
continued use of the immutability factor has actively impeded the
development of a jurisprudence of acceptance and has prevented the Equal
Protection Clause from achieving its full potential in putting an end to
government action that unfairly targets racial groups on the basis of irrational
bias.
1. Immutability, Equal Protection and the Performance of Race: Rethinking RaceRelated Traits
Judicial approaches to laws discriminating on the basis of language and
personal appearance illustrate the doctrinal shortcomings of equalprotection decisions excessively bound by the immutability factor. Consider
Olagues v. Russoniello,190 a key Ninth Circuit decision declining to extend
heightened scrutiny to classifications based on language. In the early 1980’s,
Jose Olagues and several voting-rights organizations challenged an
investigation into voting fraud conducted by the United States Attorney in
Santa Clara County on the grounds that the investigation impermissibly
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770 F.2d 791, 801 (9th Cir. 1985).

52

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 22:1

targeted, on its face, “recently registered, foreign-born voters who requested
bilingual ballots.”191 In considering the matter, the Ninth Circuit
characterized the plaintiffs’ challenge as a demand for heightened scrutiny
based on language discrimination, and rejected the notion that language
constituted a suspect class for equal-protection purposes.192 The court
pointed to Frontiero and its admonition that heightened scrutiny attaches
principally to “‘immutable characteristic[s] determined solely by the accident
of birth,’”193 and concluded that, “unlike race, place of birth, or sex,”
language is a choice.194 As the court reasoned, “Although our first choice of
language may be initially determined to some extent ‘by the accident of
birth,’ we remain free thereafter to choose another should we decide to
undertake the initiative.”195
The court’s approach to language and its rationale in rejecting
heightened scrutiny for the classification reveal the shortcomings of an equalprotection jurisprudence that unnecessarily fetishizes immutability. Rather
than asking whether language was a meritorious basis for drawing legal
distinctions or, instead, was merely serving as a basis (or a proxy) to target
individuals who have historically suffered from invidious discrimination and
lack adequate representation to receive protection from the political
branches of government, the court emphasized the purported mutability of
language. The decision’s reasoning makes the poverty of its approach clear.
Take, for instance, the words the court uses to describe the issue of language
acquisition. Overreaching to rationalize its decision on mutability grounds,
the court begins by referring to the language of one’s birth as an individual’s
“first choice” of language.196 Then, the court doubles down on the idea of
volition in language acquisition by suggesting one’s first language is an
accident of birth only to “some extent.”197 One can only wonder just what
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Id. at 793–94.
Id. at 801.
Id. (citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973)).
Id.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 801.
Id.
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part of an individual’s initial language acquisition, which is determined by
the country of someone’s birth and the parents to whom one is born, is not
an accident of birth. Moreover, the idea that initial language acquisition can
be referred to as a “choice” is fatuous.
The quixotic preoccupation with mutability has similarly infected other
cases involving race-related traits, such as hairstyle decisions and other
aspects of personal appearance. Take a seemingly routine equal-protection
case, Betts v. McCaughtry.198 In this section 1983 suit, a federal district court
granted summary judgment to defendants against claims brought by a group
of African American inmates at Wisconsin’s Waupun Correctional
Institution challenging the constitutionality of certain prison regulations
limiting the hairstyles and clothing inmates could choose and the music they
could play. According to the plaintiffs, the regulated subject matter
represented “expressions of ‘black pride’ and African-American cultural
traditions.”199 Therefore, the policies violated the inmates’ civil rights under
the First and Fourteenth Amendments and constituted, among other things,
race discrimination. In assessing whether the regulations ran afoul of the
Equal Protection Clause, the court declined to apply heightened scrutiny
since it found no evidence of discriminatory intent behind the facially raceneutral edicts.
In many ways, given that facially neutral laws are generally deemed
constitutionally sound absent a finding of both discriminatory impact and
intent,200 the Betts case appeared relatively simple at first blush. It was a
mundane illustration of the difficulties plaintiffs face, as a result of the
Supreme Court’s impact/intent requirement, in raising equal-protection
challenges to laws that ostensibly do not involve race on their face yet
implicate traits with a relationship to racial identity. However, if one
acknowledges the mutability of race, the decision’s legal analysis becomes
more challenging. Thus, while the final outcome might potentially be the
same (i.e. the regulations, in the prison environment, might still pass
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827 F. Supp. 1400, 1402 (W.D. Wisc. 1993).
Id. at 1407.
See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (holding that facially neutral laws receive
rational basis review unless the plaintiff can show both disproportionate impact and discriminatory
intent).
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heightened scrutiny), there would be good reason to question the court’s key
assumption: that the law was facially neutral in the first place.
To dissect this argument, it is first necessary to consider the court’s
rationale for rejecting the plaintiffs’ equal-protection claims. After deeming
the regulations facially neutral (since they did not overtly involve race), the
court rebuffed the argument that they were the product of discriminatory
intent. With respect to the policies related to personal appearance, the court
opined that, “[a]lthough plaintiffs characterize the grooming, hairstyle and
fingernail practices as expressions of African-American heritage, they have
not produced evidence to support a finding that they are exclusively so.” 201
Similarly, with respect to the music-censorship policy, although the court
admitted “[t]he fact that nearly all of the cassettes subject to censorship
[under the prison’s regulations] are African-American rap music,”202 it
nevertheless concluded that “it is questionable whether the censorship of
African-American rap music can be equated with discrimination against
African-American inmates.”203 In granting summary judgment on the issue
to the defendants, the court encapsulated the primary evidentiary
shortcoming of the plaintiffs: their failure “to show that the audience for this
music is exclusively black.”204
But the court’s analysis on both the personal-appearance and musiccensorship regulations suffered from several shortcomings. To begin with, a
trait need not be an exclusive expression of a particular heritage to be
inextricably race-bound. Think of dark skin. It is not an exclusive expression
of African-American heritage.
Such reductionism would be both
dramatically over-inclusive (neither individuals of Sri Lankan nor aboriginal
descent are considered to be of African heritage) and under-inclusive (many
individuals with light skin possess African lineage). Yet it would make no
sense to treat a law that differentiates on the basis of skin color as facially
neutral because it does not expressly mention race and because particular
skin colors are not exclusive expressions of a particular racial identity. Yet,
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Betts, 827 F. Supp. at 1405.
Id.
Id. The court reached this conclusion even though the policy did not outlaw other types of violent
and graphic artistic content, such as movies and books. Id. at 1404, 1407.
Id. at 1405.
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under the court’s logic, a law that treats people differently on the basis of skin
color could conceivably be deemed facially neutral, presumptively valid and
subject to only rational basis review unless the plaintiff makes an affirmative
showing of both discriminatory impact and intent. Such a posture would
significantly hamper the ability to attack laws based on skin color, even
though they are plainly racial in basis.
Meanwhile, the court’s limited willingness to strictly scrutinize laws that,
although formalistically neutral, target exclusive expressions of AfricanAmerican heritage is particularly puzzling. Quite simply, the court appears
to have articulated a standard that is impossible to meet. After all, it is fair
to wonder whether exclusive expressions even exist with respect to any given
racial heritage. The futility and absurdity of making such a showing is
epitomized when the court comically takes the plaintiffs to task for failing to
show that only African-Americans listen to rap. The fact that non-blacks
might enjoy rap, might wear braids, might eat ‘soul food’ and might
otherwise imitate or appreciate other aspects of African-American culture is
no basis to hold that targeting of such characteristics is almost certainly not
a violation of equal protection (as the application of rational-basis review all
but guarantees). Yet, by the court’s logic, a prison, school or other public
institution could ban rap music, soul food, and braids and Afros by merely
providing any rational basis (too graphic! too unhealthy! too unruly!). In the
process, such policies could survive constitutional scrutiny, even in the midst
of a conspicuous failure to ban other allegedly graphic artistic content,
unhealthy foods and unruly hairstyles.
Such a result raises significant concerns when considered in light of equal
protection’s first principle: the elimination of legal distinctions arising not
from sound public policy but, rather, irrational prejudice, particularly against
long-victimized minority groups. Such a concerted attack on certain
modalities of expressing African-American culture should properly raise
significant constitutional issues. The fact that it does not, particularly under
a traditional equal-protection analysis (as epitomized in the Betts case), stems
from our continued fetishization of immutability.
Specifically, the Betts court’s emphasis on exclusive expressions of
African-American heritage makes clear that its requirement for relief under
the Equal Protection Clause was implicitly, and problematically, driven by
notions of immutability. As we have already detailed, courts view race as an
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immutable trait. If that is the case, the exclusive expressions of a particular
heritage must necessarily be immutable as well. To the court, therefore,
blackness and its accompanying exclusive expressions (to the extent any
actually exist) are immutable and laws that implicate them enjoy heightened
scrutiny; but choices that may have a correlation with racial identity—
choices such as how to wear one’s hair or what music to play—do not receive
such judicial solicitude. Yet if race is not immutable, it has a strong
performative component, which means that the performance of race is race
itself and expression of a trait related to race is expression of race itself.205 As
a result, providing equal protection to all, regardless of race, necessitates
protecting racial identities, regardless of the volitional nature of the identityrelated trait in question. The continued emphasis on immutability prevents
such recognition, as characteristics such as one’s language or hairstyle will
continue to remain outside of the scope of heightened judicial scrutiny, even
when they constitute manifestations of race itself.206
Cast in this light, the wearing of an Afro is an act of racialization and an
Afro is, in some ways, race itself. As psychologists Otto MacLin and Roy
Malpass have documented, changes in hairstyle can dramatically alter racial
perceptions of otherwise racially ambiguous faces.207 Or consider Rachel
Dolezal. As one sensationalist headline (in the New York Post) put it, “The
Blackest Thing About Rachael Dolezal Is Her Thousand-Dollar Hair.”208
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If race is mutable, it is entirely reasonable to question why classifications on the basis of mutable
traits should necessarily be excluded from heightened scrutiny. After all, race is not a suspect
classification because it is an accident of birth and one cannot be “blamed” for their race. Rather,
racial designations are given special constitutional scrutiny because, among other things,
discrimination on the basis of race emanates from irrational prejudice—regardless of whether it is
mutable or not.
Since race is a social construct, an alteration in the way that society perceives your racial identity
is, in effect, a change in race.
Otto H. MacLin & Roy S. Malpass, Racial Categorizations of Faces: The Ambiguous Race Face Effect, 7
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 98, 109 (2001).
Tashara Jones, The Blackest Thing About Rachel Dolezal Is Her Thousand-Dollar Hair, N.Y. POST (June
16, 2015, 10:02 PM), https://nypost.com/2015/06/16/the-blackest-thing-about-rachel-dolezalis-her-thousand-dollar-hair (“Ever since the emergence of the bizarre story of the former NAACP
leader lying about her race, America has been enthralled by her spectacular, ethnic-looking hairdos.
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Putting aside the hyperbole, there is no mistaking the fact that a large part of
Dolezal’s efforts to ‘pass’ as black related to her hairstyle. A law outlawing
Afros is therefore not facially neutral and should not survive constitutional
scrutiny absent a showing of discriminatory intent. Instead, since it is part
and parcel of the social construction of race, it is a racial categorization itself
that would (and should) be subject to heightened judicial scrutiny. Indeed,
in 2019, two states—California and New York—passed legislation outlawing
discrimination on the basis of natural hairstyles. Notably, both laws were
grounded in the notion that such discrimination disproportionately impacts
people of color,209 as the statutes made the link between race and hairstyle
discrimination explicit by amending the definition of race to include “traits
historically associated with race, including, but not limited to, hair texture
and protective hairstyles.”210 These laws recognize that, although hairstyles
may be formally mutable, they are, in the words of Frank Wu, “not merely
personal preferences to be dismissed as trivial. They are symbolic of
membership within a community.”211 As such, there is growing recognition
that purportedly ‘neutral’ laws pertaining to hair can directly and
problematically implicate issues of racial identity.
2. Equal Protection, the First Amendment and Constitutional Consonance in the
Protection of Identity
When race is divorced from immutability, other traits (such as hairstyle)
inextricably bound in the construction of race can defeat facial neutrality.
Such a move not only overcomes certain problematic aspects of the
impact/intent requirement which have received significant criticism in the
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Whether she’s sporting kinky curls or immaculately kept dreadlocks, there’s no doubt that Dolezal
has nailed the color and texture of some classic African-American styles.”).
See Janelle Griffith, New York is Second State to Ban Discrimination Based on Natural Hairstyles, NBC NEWS
(July 15, 2019, 6:57 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/nbcblk/new-york-second-state-bandiscrimination-based-natural-hairstyles-n1029931.
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 212.1(b) (2019); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 11 (2019); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292
(2019).
Frank Wu, Victory for Natural Black Hair Benefits All of Us, DIVERSE: ISSUES IN HIGHER EDUC., July
12, 2019, https://diverseeducation.com/article/149645/.
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academic literature;212 it also helps bring the First and Fourteenth
Amendments into better alignment with one another. Specifically, equal
protection’s focus on immutability has unwittingly created a tension between
Fourteenth Amendment and First Amendment rights. Under extant equalprotection jurisprudence, race and gender-based classifications are given
heightened judicial scrutiny precisely because they are conceptualized as
innate characteristics that are “accident[s] of birth,”213 rather than as
choices. Meanwhile, under the First Amendment, limitations on speech and
expressive conduct are given heightened judicial scrutiny precisely because
they are conceived of as choices (i.e., they are volitional and have
communicative intent).214 As such, constitutional jurisprudence views First
and Fourteenth Amendment protections as pertaining to wholly separate res:
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Mario L. Barnes & Erwin Chemerinsky, What Can Brown Do for You? Addressing McCleskey v. Kemp
as a Flawed Standard for Measuring the Constitutionally Significant Risk of Race Bias, 112 NW. U. L. REV.
1293, 1301 (2018) (arguing that “[t]he Supreme Court’s decisions over the last forty years requiring
proof of discriminatory purpose in order to demonstrate an equal protection violation, including
in McCleskey v. Kemp, have dramatically lessened the ability of claimants to use the Constitution to
create a more just society. These decisions are terribly misguided and the Court has compounded
the problem by adopting a standard for proving intent that is very difficult to meet.”) (citations
omitted); Kenneth L. Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 50 (1977) (criticizing the discriminatory purpose requirement by arguing that, “[w]hen the
context is race . . . the problem of the stigma of caste cannot be confined to purposeful stigmatizing
action. It is a global problem, this inheritance from slavery and the system of racial subordination
that took slavery’s place.”); Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of
Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1111 (1997) (positing that “the doctrine of
discriminatory purpose currently sanctions facially neutral state action that perpetuates race and
gender stratification, so long as such regulation is not justified in discredited forms of status-based
reasoning. Once we recognize that the rules and reasons the legal system employs to enforce status
relations evolve as they are contested, we ought to scrutinize justifications for facially neutral state
action with skepticism, knowing that we may be rationalizing practices that perpetuate historic
forms of stratification, much as Plessy v. Ferguson once did.”).
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973).
Expressive conduct, the Supreme Court tells us, requires intentionality (i.e., volitional decisionmaking) and a message apparent to the observers of the conduct. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (“In deciding whether particular conduct possesses sufficient communicative
elements to bring the First Amendment into play, we have asked whether ‘[a]n intent to convey a
particularized message was present, and [whether] the likelihood was great that the message would
be understood by those who viewed it.’”) (citing Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11
(1974)). Absent significant justification, the government cannot interfere with such expressive
choices. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 407.
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expressive choices may receive free-speech scrutiny, while immutable parts
of one’s being may receive equal-protections scrutiny.
By removing immutability from considerations as to whether a
classification is suspect, we open up heightened scrutiny for characteristics
that are inextricably related to race (and frequently constitute an indelible
part of racialization, either as imposed by society or as exertions of individual
performance of race) but constitute choices rather than “accidents of birth.”
In so doing, we do not just vindicate the right to be free of discrimination
from traits over which we have no control, but also extend protection to traits
over which we do, particularly when they constitute an intricate aspect of
race.
Under a reconstituted equal-protection doctrine that omits immutability,
the Fourteenth Amendment and the First Amendment can work together in
elevating tolerance for key identity-related features. In other words, by
recognizing the mutability of race but nevertheless giving race strict scrutiny,
other choices incident to race or akin to race (i.e., key identity-related markers
that are performative in nature) would also enjoy the benefits of equal
protection. They would no longer depend on a claim of immutability for
protection. Such a reformulation of equal protection in light of the
mutability of race therefore has the ability to expand important constitutional
protections beyond the limits of that which is ostensibly immutable and, as a
result, has critical implications for judicial recognition of the inherent
expressive and dignitary interests entwined with such traits as personal
appearance, language, culture and even sexual orientation. And, as we shall
discuss infra, such a tact allows equal protection to merge with expressive
freedom to promote heightened acceptance of, and respect for, the rights of
minority groups that have historically faced discrimination.
Under such a regime—where laws invoking traits that are reflective of
individual identity enjoy meaningful judicial review, regardless of whether
those traits are chosen or the product of the “accidents of birth”—equal
protection aligns itself with free speech rights related to the expression of
identity. This contrasts significantly to the state of our current jurisprudence,
where equal protection and expressive freedom are concepts that, at best, are
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at odds with another, if not mutually exclusive altogether. In short,
recognition of the mutability of race and its inextricably performative
elements allows for a reconceptualization of the meaning of facial neutrality
and the advancement of a greater consonance between the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.
3. Immutability and the Development of a Jurisprudence of Acceptance
Perhaps most significantly, the continuing fetishization of immutability in
the equal-protection calculus has impeded the realization of a jurisprudence
of acceptance (rather than one of just mere tolerance)—not only with respect
to race and race-related traits, but more broadly to other classifications that
also have little to no link to merit and have a long history of being targeted
on the basis of animus and bias. The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on
sexual orientation illustrates the way in which immutability’s place in equal
protection doctrine continues to constrain the courts from embracing a more
robust form of equal protection that truly subverts subordination practices.
With its decision in Obergefell v. Hodges,215 the Supreme Court famously
recognized the constitutional right to same sex marriage, proclaiming that
there is “dignity in the bond between two men or two women who seek to
marry and in their autonomy to make such profound choices” and
concluding that any refusal to legally sanctify same-sex marriage would
constitute the “imposition of [a] disability on gays and lesbians [that] serves
to disrespect and subordinate them.”216 Obergefell thus took a critical steps
towards celebrating the dignitary interests of gays and affirmatively
renounce, and push back against, all discrimination against individuals on
the basis of sexual orientation. But an exegesis of Justice Kennedy’s majority
opinion suggests that the Court’s continued need to grapple with the issue of
immutability (as compelled by the extant jurisprudence) ultimately
diminished the force of Obergefell’s blow against subordination practices and
its celebration of diverse sexualities.
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135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
Id. at 2604.
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First, Kennedy’s decision actually asserted the immutability of sexual
orientation, declaring, in a remarkable line, that, “in more recent years[,]
psychiatrists and others recognized that sexual orientation is both a normal
expression of human sexuality and immutable.”217 In other words, the Court
was signaling a change in its prior position, which viewed homosexuality as
a “lifestyle”218 and, implicitly, a choice. Such a move was unusual for several
reasons. As a predicate matter, since the Court ultimately did not grant
heightened scrutiny to sexual orientation,219 the decision did not need to deal
with the issue of immutability at all. Moreover, the source to which Kennedy
cited in support of the immutability proposition—the American
Psychological Association (“APA”)’s amicus brief—said nothing of the sort.
Indeed, the APA carefully eschewed taking an absolute position on
orientation fluidity and, in fact, expressly avoided use of the word
‘immutable.’ In tempered language, the APA Brief concluded that sexual
orientation is “[i]s [g]enerally [n]ot chosen, and [i]s [h]ighly [r]esistant to
[c]hange.”220 To support this statement, the APA Brief noted that 88% of
gay men and 68% of lesbians reported that they had ‘no choice at all’ in their
orientation221—meaning that 12% of gay men and 32% of lesbians suggested
they may have had some level of choice. To wit, the APA brief recounted
that 5% of gay men and 16% of lesbians reported feeling that they had ‘a fair
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Id. at 2596 (internal citations omitted).
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (referring to plaintiffs as “two adults who, with full
and mutual consent . . . engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle.”).
See Peter Nicolas, Fundamental Rights in a Post-Obergefell World, 27 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 331, 333
(2016) (“Post-Windsor, several lower federal courts declared the state law analogues to DOMA to be
unconstitutional on class-based equal protection grounds—invoking Windsor as a basis for declaring
classifications based on sexual orientation to be suspect or quasi-suspect and thus subject to some
form of heightened scrutiny. However, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Obergefell eschewed
deciding the case on that basis. Instead, the Court concluded that such laws interfered with the
fundamental right to marry protected primarily by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause but also buttressed by its Equal Protection Clause.”) (citations omitted).
Brief for American Psychological Association et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 7,
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (Nos. 14-556; 14-562; 14-571; 14-574), 2015 WL
1004713.
Id. at 8–9.
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amount’ or ‘a great deal’ of choice regarding their sexual orientation.222 In
short, Kennedy’s citation to the APA Brief to establish the purported
immutability of sexual orientation was, at best, disingenuous. Of course,
Kennedy’s reference to immutability may have served to set the table for a
future court to grant heightened scrutiny to sexual orientation—when public
opinion ultimately catches up with elite opinion. But, such a tactic takes a
backwards approach to the constitutional protection of civil rights because
the need for heightened judicial scrutiny—and a check on majoritarianism—
is at its greatest when there is widespread animus against a “discreet and
insular minority,”223 not when public acceptance of that minority has finally
been achieved.
Second, Obergefell stubbornly fixated on immutability in another sense.
Specifically, it rested the decision on the need to protect dignitary interests of
those for whom there is definitively no choice in the matter: the children of
same-sex couples. In this sense, the Obergefell Court was no different than
other Western courts, whom Debora Spar observes curiously did not start to
recognize same-sex marriages until faced with the advent of reproductive
technologies that eased the ability of same-sex couples to have children who
are biologically related to at least one parent.224 It was only at that time that
that courts could point to the important interests in protecting children with
a stable and respected family structure.225 In this vein, the Obergefell Court
emphasizes the harm that social opprobrium of same-sex relations inflicts on
the children in those relations.226 Here, the Court’s machinations almost
seem to obscure the harm done to same-sex couples themselves. After all, no
matter how badly societal stigmas might hurt the children of such couples,
they will impact the couples themselves most immediately and for their entire
lives. With this in mind, the Obergefell decision’s ponderous fetishization of
the dignitary interests of children of same-sex couples (perhaps above those
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Id. at 8.
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
Jonathan Shaw, Technology, Paternity, Patriarchy, HARV. MAG., Mar.–Apr. 2019,
https://harvardmagazine.com/2019/03/marriage-technology-feminism (reviewing DEBORA
SPAR, THE VIRGIN AND THE PLOW (forthcoming 2020)).
See id. (citing Spar’s position that the availability of in vitro fertilization and other reproductive
technologies to same-sex couples helped accelerate judicial acceptance of same-sex marriage).
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2590 (2015).
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of the same-sex couple itself) begins to feel like a search to reconcile the
decision on the grounds of someone’s immutability. Unable to definitively
establish the immutability of the same-sex parents’ sexual orientation, the
Court points to the protection of their children, who possess the immutable
status of being born to same-sex parents.
Kennedy’s rhetorical move may have reflected an argumentative
strategy, employed to persuade those who may believe that homosexuality is
a chosen lifestyle (and an immoral one at that, not entitled to constitutional
protection) but who might soften their position to protect children of
homosexuals who cannot and should not be forced to answer for the
perceived sins of their parents. In this light, this aspect of the decision echoes
the rationale of Plyler v Doe,227 where the Supreme Court, claiming to apply
rational-basis review, struck a Texas law that denied the children of
undocumented aliens residing in the state access to public education. In
Plyler, the Court conceded that undocumented status was a mutable
characteristic (subject only to rational-basis review) but drew a sharp
distinction between the equal-protection entitlements of undocumented
adults and those of their children, thereby resting its decision on the
protection of those targeted for a status that they have acquired “through no
fault of their own.”228 As the Plyler Court opined:
Persuasive arguments support the view that a State may withhold its
beneficence from those whose very presence within the United States is the
product of their own unlawful conduct. These arguments do not apply with
the same force to classifications imposing disabilities on the minor children
of such illegal entrants.229

Since the law at issue was “directed against children, and imposes its
discriminatory burden on the basis of a legal characteristic over which
children can have little control,”230 the Court found that it failed to survive
equal-protection scrutiny. The undocumented children’s “accident of birth”
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457 U.S. 202 (1982).
Id. at 226.
Id. at 219–20 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 220.
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therefore became the holding’s fulcrum, justifying the application of a “more
searching” form of rational-basis review that resulted in the striking of the
statute.231
Obergefell therefore leaves at least some room to continue to view samesex couples as transgressive in some way (like undocumented aliens) but
firmly rebukes putting a toll for those transgressions on their children. After
all, even though the result of the case ultimately affirmed the rights of
homosexuals, Obergefell still failed to embrace the application of heightened
scrutiny to classifications based on sexual orientation,232 despite the fact that
gays constitute a minority group that has long suffered invidious
discrimination and lacks sufficient numbers to seek appropriate political
redress through majoritarian channels.233 Ultimately, such a result leaves
protection of sexual orientation on uncertain grounds going forward as future
courts which may be less inclined to protect sexual orientation may decline
to apply a particularly searching form of rational basis when assessing laws
implicating sexual orientation. In the end, therefore, Obergefell does not quite
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233

Id.
See Louis Michael Seidman, The Triumph of Gay Marriage and the Failure of Constitutional Law, 2015 SUP.
CT. REV. 115, 117 (2016) (referencing Obergefell’s lack of “discussion of tiers of review, suspect
classes, strict scrutiny, or narrow tailoring”).
See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (holding that Boy Scouts of America has a
constitutional right to ban gay individuals based on the First Amendment’s freedom of association);
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to a Georgia antisodomy law and denying the existence of a constitutional right of homosexuals to engage in private
sexual conduct); One, Inc. v. Olesen, 241 F.2d 772, 778 (9th Cir. 1957) (affirming a local U.S.
postmaster’s decision to decline to deliver copies of a gay magazine, in part, on constitutional
grounds and asserting that its articles were “morally depraving and debasing” and that the
magazine as a whole was therefore “obscene and filthy”), rev’d, 355 U.S. 371 (1958). But see Romer
v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 645–46 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (claiming that “[t]he problem (a
problem, that is, for those who wish to retain social disapprobation of homosexuality) is that,
because those who engage in homosexual conduct tend to reside in disproportionate numbers in
certain communities, have high disposable income, and, of course, care about homosexual-rights
issues much more ardently than the public at large, they possess political power much greater than
their numbers, both locally and statewide. Quite understandably, they devote this political power
to achieving not merely a grudging social toleration, but full social acceptance, of homosexuality.”)
(citations omitted).
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represent as powerful a blow against subordination on the basis of sexual
orientation as one might initially think.
Obergefell’s fetishization of immutability also comes with other dangers.
For many years, gay-rights activists have focused their strategy (largely based
on the template for gender and the immutability language of Frontiero and its
progeny) on suggesting that sexual orientation is an immutable trait and,
therefore, subject to heightened scrutiny.234 The effort has enjoyed notable
success. In several circuits, courts have expressly granted suspect-category
status to sexual orientation.235 And although the Supreme Court has, to date,
avoided issuing such a holding,236 it has clearly applied a particularly
searching form of rational basis review to its scrutiny of laws distinguishing
on the basis of sexual orientation.237
At the same time, however, many of those advocating for an
immutability-driven position have themselves expressed discomfort with the
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See, e.g., Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1196 n.12 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (considering (and
rejecting) a same-sex couple’s claim that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation should be
given heightened scrutiny on the grounds that “homosexuals constitute ‘a politically voiceless and
invisible minority,’ that being homosexual, generally speaking, is an immutable characteristic, and
that homosexuals are a group with a long history of discrimination subject to myths and
stereotypes”) (citations omitted).
See, e.g., SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 480–81 (9th Cir. 2014)
(interpreting United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) as dictating the application of heightened
scrutiny to classifications based on sexual orientation even though Windsor was silent on the issue of
standard of review); Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 181–82 (2d Cir. 2012) (weighing the
extant Supreme Court factors on whether a classification is suspect to ultimately hold that laws
distinguishing on the basis of sexual orientation are subject to heightened scrutiny), aff’d on other
grounds sub nom. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2596 (2015). Though the Court described sexual
orientation as “immutable” in Obergefell, it did not hold that sexual orientation was a suspect
classification entitled to heightened scrutiny. Id.
See, e.g., William D. Araiza, The Section 5 Power and the Rational Basis Standard of Equal Protection, 79
TUL. L. REV. 519, 523 (2005) (describing the purported application of rational basis review in
recent sexual orientation cases as, in fact, “rational basis plus”); Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal
Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 759 (2011) (describing the purported application of rational basis
in recent sexual orientation cases as, in fact, “rational basis with bite”).
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strategy238—and with good reason. After all, resting the protection of sexual
orientation on its purported immutability makes protection, per se,
immutability-dependent. Such a strategy could backfire if, down the line, it
is determined “scientifically” that sexual orientations are the product of both
nature and nurture.239 A change from such a consensus could therefore
subvert hard-won protections, a possibility made real by a widely-publicized
2019 genome-wide association study240 that triggered headlines confidently
declaring that there is “no gay gene.”241
More pointedly, the primacy of immutability seems to suggest that sexual
preferences should not be protected if they are the product of choice. Such
a view troublingly replicates certain institutional positions that have
effectively treated gays as second-class citizens while paying lip service to
tolerance. For almost two decades, of course, the American military carried
out the inordinately tortured “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy242 that enabled
gay men and women to serve in the military but forced them to suppress
entire parts of their identities that their heterosexual colleagues were able to
enjoy openly.243 Similarly, numerous churches have taken the position of
allowing gay parishioners into their community so long as those individuals
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See Halley, supra note 183, at 921 (“Confronted with the supposed requirement for heightened
scrutiny that the proposed classification be based on an immutable trait, advocates of gay, lesbian,
and bisexual rights have almost uniformly—though often with visible qualms—embraced the
argument that homosexuality is immutable.”).
See, e.g., Sexual Orientation & Homosexuality, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N, https://www.apa.org/
topics/lgbt/orientation (opining that “[t]here is no consensus among scientists about the exact
reasons that an individual develops . . . [their] orientation” and that “[m]any think that nature and
nurture both play complex roles; most people experience little or no sense of choice about their
sexual orientation”) (last visited Nov. 4, 2019).
Andrea Ganna et al., Large-Scale GWAS Reveals Insights into the Genetic Architecture of Same-Sex Sexual
Behavior, SCIENCE, Aug. 30, 2019, https://science.sciencemag.org/content/365/6456/eaat7693.
See, e.g., Susan Scutti, No ‘Gay Gene’ Can Predict Sexual Orientation, Study Says, CNN (Aug. 30, 2019,
1:12 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/08/30/health/gay-gene-study-trnd/index.html; A
Scientific Study Has Established That There Is No ‘Gay Gene,’ ECONOMIST (Aug. 31, 2019),
https://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2019/08/31/a-scientific-study-has-establis
hed-that-there-is-no-gay-gene.
10 U.S.C. § 654 (1993), repealed by Pub. L. No. 111–321, § 2(f)(1)(A), 124 Stat. 3516 (2010).
Id.
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do not engage in same-sex relations.244 Such equivocal regimes implicitly
draw a distinction between what individuals purportedly cannot control
(being ‘born gay’) and what they purportedly can (acting upon their sexual
attraction). And it is this quest for separating the immutable from the chosen
that causes gay people to suffer from a full recognition of their dignitary
rights. They are forced to lead lives with incomplete expressions of their
personhood. Resting the extension of rights on the basis of immutability
effectively excludes the volitional components of one’s sexual identity from
protection and, in the process, impedes a complete acceptance (let alone
celebration) of diverse sexualities. Indeed, applying heightened scrutiny to a
trait regardless of its mutability sends a far more powerful message of
inclusion from the judiciary than a reluctant tolerance grounded in
immutability. As the Obergefell decision itself recognized, judicial recognition
of the legal rights and inherent dignity of a disfavored group is a critical step
for that group achieving acceptance into mainstream society.245 When legal
protection becomes available to individuals whether they are acting on the
basis of immutable biology or volitional choice (such as the very decision to
marry), the message of respect becomes all the more powerful since it reflects
affirmative acceptance, rather than passive tolerance.
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See, e.g., Same-Sex Attraction, CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS,
https://www.churchofjesuschrist.org/study/manual/gospel-topics/same-sex-attraction?lang=eng
&_r=1 (stating that “[t]he Church distinguishes between same-sex attraction and homosexual
behavior. People who experience same-sex attraction or identify as gay, lesbian, or bisexual can
make and keep covenants with God and fully and worthily participate in the Church” but that
“[s]exual relations between a man and woman who are not married, or between people of the same
sex, violate one of our Father in Heaven’s most important laws and get in the way of our eternal
progress”) (last visited Sept. 22, 2019).
See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015) (closing its penultimate paragraph by stating:
“[t]hey ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the law. The Constitution grants them that right.”); see
also Kyle C. Velte, Obergefell’s Expressive Promise, 6 HOUS. L. REV.: OFF THE REC. 157, 161 (2015)
(“The expressive function of U.S. Supreme Court opinions is particularly powerful because most
Americans take note of the decisions. The Court’s opinions take on a symbolic character because
they are seen as ‘speaking on behalf of the nation’s basic principles and commitments.’”) (citing
Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2028 (1996)).
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CONCLUSION
The legal fiction of racial immutability has grown obsolescent.
Introduced by accident, the continued use of immutability in the equalprotection calculus has not only failed to reflect the realities of racial fluidity
but has also impeded the development of a jurisprudence of acceptance—
both with respect to race-related traits and other characteristics, such as
sexual orientation, that can form key aspects of personal identity. That said,
it is worth noting that the erstwhile emphasis on immutability, particularly
vis-à-vis race, makes some sense when considered in context. In the early
stages of the civil rights movement, the need to convince a (largely) skeptical
white population about the moral and legal rectitude of prohibiting racial
discrimination spurred the adoption of results-oriented compromises246—
compromises that would make sense at the moment but might later cause
problems. Framed in this light, the casting of race as immutable perhaps
served a time-specific purpose. After all, the idea that people couldn’t help
their dark skin and their “unfortunate race”—a condescending phrase used
repeatedly by the Supreme Court in the nineteenth century to refer to
various non-white groups247—appealed to a widespread view that Molly
Townes O’Brien has dubbed “white paternalism,”248—a form of proto-
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As Derick Bell famously posited with his interest-convergence theory, a majority race will generally
support equality for minorities only when doing so advances its own interests. See Derrick Bell,
Brown and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, in SHADES OF BROWN: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION 91–106 (Derrick Bell ed., 1980). Bell’s key example in support of his proposition
was the strategic and symbolic value that Brown v. Board of Education provided to the white majority
and the United States Government in waging the Cold War. See id.
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1856) (referring to African-Americans as an
“unfortunate race” who “the civilized and enlightened portions of the world at the time of the
Declaration of Independence, and when the Constitution of the United States was framed and
adopted” deemed to be of “an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race,
either in social or political relations” and were therefore not interpreted to be “a part of the people”
to which the Constitution refers as the American polity) (emphasis added); see also United States v.
Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 572 (1846) (summarizing the Court’s interpretation of the history of
Native American relations by claiming that the United States government “has exercised its power
over this unfortunate race in the spirit of humanity and justice, and has endeavoured by every means
in its power to enlighten their minds and increase their comforts, and to save them if possible from
the consequences of their own vices”) (emphasis added).
Molly Townes O’Brien, Justice John Marshall Harlan as Prophet: The Plessy Dissenter’s Color-Blind
Constitution, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 753, 755 (1998).
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enlightenment that helped achieve valuable moves (such as Harlan’s Plessy
dissent) in the early stages of the civil rights movement but ultimately failed
(and refused) to subvert white supremacy. But, as we have detailed in Part II,
any potential value in the use of the immutability factor has long since
receded.
That said, the integration of racial fluidity into equal-protection doctrine
will not be without challenges with which both future scholarship and
jurisprudence must grapple. First, courts will have to determine whether to
throw out the concept of immutability altogether or retain it in a softened
form that acknowledges some level of fluidity and choice in the racialization
process. Troubled by the prevailing, restrictive definition of immutability
(which appears to exclude traits that have any non-biological basis, involve
any level of choice or constitute the product of one’s life (as opposed to birth)
circumstances) and the consequences of this view on equal-protection
doctrine, some state courts and lower federal courts have reconceptualized
immutability into a more pliable concept. In employing such a strategy,
these courts have managed to circumvent and distinguish inconvenient
Supreme Court precedent.
One of the earliest illustrations of this latter tact comes from the Ninth
Circuit’s 1988 decision in Watkins v. U.S. Army,249 when it considered an equal
protection challenge to the military’s decision to discharge a soldier on
grounds of his sexual orientation. In an opinion ultimately withdrawn when
the case was decided on narrower grounds en banc,250 the court effectively
disregarded the then-binding Bowers v. Hardwick decision (and the Supreme
Court’s apparent endorsement of discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation in the case) and held that sexual orientation was a suspect class
and that government distinctions based on it were subject to strict scrutiny—
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847 F.2d 1329, 1349 (9th Cir. 1988), opinion withdrawn on reh’g, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en
banc).
The opinion was ultimately withdrawn en banc when the full court decided the case on narrower
grounds. See Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (holding that the Army
could not bar a soldier’s reenlistment solely because of his homosexuality).
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a scrutiny the Army’s action failed to pass.251 In its attempt to reconcile the
Supreme Court’s precedent on suspect classes, the panel chose to take a soft
reading of the immutability factor: “Although the Supreme Court considers
immutability relevant, it is clear that by ‘immutability’ the Court has never
meant strict immutability in the sense that members of the class must be
physically unable to change or mask the trait defining their class[,]”252 the
panel opined. “People can have operations to change their sex. Aliens can
ordinarily become naturalized citizens. The status of illegitimate children can
be changed.”253 Then, invoking the dynamics of passing and covering and
the role that individuals can have in how they are racialized, the panel added
that:
People can frequently hide their national origin by changing their customs,
their names, or their associations. Lighter skinned blacks can sometimes
‘pass’ for white, as can Latinos for Anglos, and some people can even change
their racial appearance with pigment injections. At a minimum, then, the
Supreme Court is willing to treat a trait as effectively immutable if changing
it would involve great difficulty, such as requiring a major physical change
or a traumatic change of identity. Reading the case law in a more capacious
manner, ‘immutability’ may describe those traits that are so central to a
person’s identity that it would be abhorrent for government to penalize a
person for refusing to change them, regardless of how easy that change might
be physically. Racial discrimination, for example, would not suddenly
become constitutional if medical science developed an easy, cheap, and
painless method of changing one’s skin pigment. 254

Watkins’s more-pliable notion of immutability was ahead of its time and,
by the twenty-first century, had gained traction. In 2008, when the
California Supreme Court considered whether denying sex-same marriage
would conflict with the state’s equal protection clause, it held in the
affirmative, suggesting that “Because a person’s sexual orientation is so
integral an aspect of one’s identity, it is not appropriate to require a person
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Watkins, 847 F.2d at 1349 (“Having concluded that homosexuals constitute a suspect class, we must
subject the Army’s regulations facially discriminating against homosexuals to strict scrutiny.”).
Id. at 1347.
Id.
Id. (citing JOHN HOWARD GRIFFIN, BLACK LIKE ME (1977)).
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to repudiate or change his or her sexual orientation in order to avoid
discriminatory treatment.”255 By 2014, at least one Ninth Circuit panel
would also regard a more flexible definition of immutability—one that does
not require a trait be strictly unchangeable—as settled law of the Circuit,
concluding, “We have recognized that ‘[s]exual orientation and sexual
identity are immutable; they are so fundamental to one’s identity that a
person should not be required to abandon them.’”256 This “new
immutability,”257 has earned support in the academic literature as well.258
But, of course, the Supreme Court itself has never adopted such a
softened view of immutability; while lower courts have attempted to impute
a lax gloss on immutability, the actual language of Supreme Court rulings
does not seem to support such a reading.259 In Frontiero, the Court defined
an immutable trait as one “determined solely by the accident of birth.”260
Such a framing of immutability does not appear to lend itself to any kind of
malleability, particularly as a result of one’s choices (as difficult as effectuating
the change might be). Indeed, it is worth noting that no less than Stephen
Reinhardt, long dubbed the ‘liberal lion’ of the Ninth Circuit for his famously
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In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 442 (Cal. 2008).
Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 464 n.4 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal citations omitted).
See Clarke, supra note 187, at 24.
See, e.g., Zachary A. Kramer, The New Sex Discrimination, 63 DUKE L.J. 891, 949 (2014) (“Maybe we
need a softer definition of immutability. Rather than thinking of traits as locked identities, we can
define immutability as a trait that is so central to our sense of self that it would be extremely difficult
to change.”); Anthony R. Enriquez, Note, Assuming Responsibility for Who You Are: The Right to Choose
“Immutable” Identity Characteristics, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 373, 377 (2013) (suggesting that courts adopt
the notion of “‘fundamental immutability’” from asylum cases, such that “an immutable
characteristic is not simply a quality one cannot change, determined at birth. Rather, as a baseline,
it is an electable status that one should not be forced to change because it is fundamental to
identity.”).
See generally Marc R. Shapiro, Treading the Supreme Court’s Murky Immutability Waters, 38 GONZ. L. REV.
409, 411 (2002) (noting that, “[t]ime and again, the Court’s opinions limit their evaluation of
immutability to the analogizing of the proposed trait to characteristics previously classified as
immutable. Thus, the Court has avoided a substantive, legal construction of the term.”).
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (emphasis added).
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progressive jurisprudence261 and his enduring support of gay rights,262
actually logged the dissent in the Watkins decision, remarkably stating that he
could not support the majority’s interpretation of binding Supreme Court
precedent. “Like the majority,” he noted:
I believe that homosexuals have been unfairly treated both historically and
in the United States today. Were I free to apply my own view of the meaning
of the Constitution and in that light to pass upon the validity of the Army’s
regulations, I too would conclude that the Army may not refuse to enlist
homosexuals.263

But, as Reinhardt went on to explain:
I am bound . . . as a circuit judge to apply the Constitution as it has been
interpreted by the Supreme Court and our own circuit, whether or not I
agree with those interpretations. Because of this requirement, I am
sometimes compelled to reach a result I believe to be contrary to the proper
interpretation of constitutional principles. This is, regrettably, one of those
times.264
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See Sam Roberts, Stephen Reinhardt, Liberal Lion of Federal Court, Dies at 87, N.Y. TIMES, April 2, 2018,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/02/obituaries/stephen-reinhardt-liberal-lion-of-federalcourt-dies-at-87.html (describing Judge Reinhardt as a “liberal lion”).
See Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570
U.S. 693 (2013) (affirming district court’s finding that California constitutional amendment
restricting marriage to opposite sex couples violated the equal protection and due process clauses
of the Fourteenth Amendment); Watkins v. U.S. Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1356, 1358 (9th Cir. 1988)
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (“Were it not for Hardwick (and other cases discussed infra), I would agree
[that homosexuals must be treated as a suspect class], for in my opinion the group meets all the
applicable criteria . . . . In my opinion, invidious discrimination against a group of persons with
immutable characteristics can never be justified on the grounds of society’s moral disapproval. No
lesson regarding the meaning of our Constitution could be more important for us as a nation to
learn. I believe that the Supreme Court egregiously misinterpreted the Constitution in Hardwick. In
my view, Hardwick improperly condones official bias and prejudice against homosexuals, and
authorizes the criminalization of conduct that is an essential part of the intimate sexual life of our
many homosexual citizens, a group that has historically been the victim of unfair and irrational
treatment. I believe that history will view Hardwick much as it views Plessey v. Ferguson . . . . And I
am confident that, in the long run, Hardwick, like Plessy, will be overruled by a wiser and more
enlightened Court.”) (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)).
Watkins, 847 F.2d at 1353.
Id.
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Thus, even Reinhardt suggested that the majority had deviated from
binding Supreme Court precedent, even though Reinhardt strongly
disagreed with such precedent.
Moreover, as Jessica Clarke has cautioned, even adoption of a pliable
notion of immutability would continue to bear some unacceptable risks.
Specifically, such a notion of immutability would still require protected traits
to be “fundamental to one’s identity”—a position that not all individuals will
(or even should) ascribe to their race, gender or sexual orientation.265 As
Clarke points out, use of the new immutability standard actually flips
traditional non-discrimination principles on their head.
The new
immutability protects identity traits because they are important, whereas
traditional non-discrimination principles posit that “individuals should be
judged according to their qualifications rather than extraneous identity traits
such as race, sex, and disability” and that, therefore, these are “forbidden
grounds for discrimination not because they are important, but because they
are not.”266
Second, regardless of whether the Supreme Court ultimately adopts this
more capacious definition of immutability or rids itself altogether of the
immutability fiction, courts will have to develop new standards to distinguish
between those mutable traits that will receive heightened scrutiny because
they are so essential to personal identity that “it would be abhorrent for
government to penalize a person for refusing to change them,”267 and those
traits that will not. To take an example from our discussion of Betts v.
McCaughtry,268 perhaps hairstyle is so intimately related to personal identity
and the performative aspects of race that regulations of it will receive
heightened scrutiny, while music may not be so imbued with racial meaning
such that regulations related to it would not receive anything more than
rational basis review from an equal-protection perspective.269 The
formulation of such distinctions would inevitably force courts to make
judgment calls and to delve into racial hermeneutics. But as challenging as
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Clarke, supra note 187, at 39.
Id. at 42.
Id. at 5.
827 F. Supp. 1400 (W.D. Wis. 1993).
However, it would undoubtedly receive heightened scrutiny under the First Amendment.
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such a proposition might be, given the stubborn persistence of race as a key
dividing point in American society through the centuries—even after the
successes of the civil rights movement—such a move may be the only way
for our law to truly challenge subordination practices related to race.
Third, once they acknowledge the mutability of race, courts will have to
contend with how we might deal with the potential abuse of fluidity. On one
hand, elective choices pertaining to race deserve protection and recognition.
On the other hand, there is good reason to believe that disingenuous
manipulation of race for the purposes of obtaining race-based benefits should
not go unaddressed. Specifically, if courts acknowledge the fluidity of race,
a growing number of individuals might be tempted to disingenuously claim
racial affiliations. In the process, they might subvert the purpose and efficacy
of remedial-race based programs—programs that serve the compelling
government interests in rectifying both past and present racial discrimination
and inequality. As a result, courts will have to carefully balance racial agency
with fraud prevention.
One potential source of guidance for balancing these competing interests
comes from the treatment of another fundamental identity trait which is
mutable: religion. To ensure religious freedom, the state grants certain
exemptions when religious beliefs would otherwise clash with a particular
edict. Laws such as the Religious Freedom Restoration Act270 and the
Selective Service Act271 contain such exemptions. But such exemptions come
with a risk: that the unscrupulous could potentially exploit them by
concocting beliefs that are deemed religious in nature. To prevent the
improper exploitation of such exemptions, courts have upheld the right to
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Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014) (noting that the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act “prohibits the Federal Government from taking any action that
substantially burdens the exercise of religion unless that action constitutes the least restrictive means
of serving a compelling government interest.”).
See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) (noting that the Universal Military Training and
Service Act exempted from combat individuals who, by reason of their “religious training and
belief,” conscientiously objected to participation in war in any form).
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scrutinize attempts to qualify for such exemptions.272 But, when exercising
this right of review, courts take an important middle-ground position. They
do not shirk from the project at hand. But, at the same time, in order to
protect the sanctity of the freedom of belief, the Supreme Court has
prohibited any inquiry into the veracity of the beliefs.273 Thus, courts limit
their review just to the bona fides of the individual, i.e., whether the purported
belief of the individual is “sincerely held.”274 As Tseming Yang has noted,
such a limit can provide a powerful check on opportunistic uses of selfidentification.275 Judicial scrutiny of race fraud could benefit from a similar
approach.
Such an approach has its disadvantages, however, as the case of Rachael
Dolezal highlights. In 2015, Dolezal’s story made international headlines.
The city of Spokane, Washington announced an investigation into whether
Dolezal, the president of NAACP’s local chapter and instructor in the
Africana Studies program at Eastern Washington State University, had
violated the city’s code of ethics by deeming herself “African-American” on
her application to serve on a local police ombudsman commission.276
Dolezal’s own mother called her daughter a fraud, stating that both she and
Dolezal’s father were white and publicly releasing images showing Dolezal
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Id. at 185 (noting that, “while the ‘truth’ of a belief is not open to question [in religious exemption
cases], there remains the significant question whether it is ‘truly held.’ This is the threshold question
of sincerity which must be resolved in every case.”).
The Supreme Court has strictly forbidden inquiries into the factual credence of any religious belief.
See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944) (“[W]e do not agree that the truth or verity of
respondents’ religious doctrines or beliefs should have been submitted to the jury . . . [as] the First
Amendment precludes such a course.”).
Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 726 (1981) (to grant religious-based
exemption/benefit, “the State must necessarily inquire whether the claimant’s belief is ‘religious’
and whether it is sincerely held. Otherwise any dissatisfied employee may leave his job without
cause and claim that he did so because his own particular beliefs required it.”); see also Ballard, 322
U.S. at 84 (allowing charge to jury to determine “whether or not the defendants honestly and in
good faith believed the representations” but not whether their representations were actually true).
Yang, supra note 78, at 384.
Brendan O’Connor, Spokane NAACP President’s Mom Says Daughter Pretending to Be Black, GAWKER
(June 11, 2015, 10:35 PM), https://gawker.com/spokane-naacp-presidents-mom-says-daughterpretending-t-1710788405.
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with blonde-hair, blue-eyes and fair skin as a child.277 Dolezal’s antics
became tabloid fodder and she paid a price for the unwanted attention and
the revelations that came with it.278 She lost both her NAACP and teaching
positions and faced widespread public ridicule.279 But Dolezal remained
undeterred, even doubling down on her African-American identity. She is
no longer known as Rachel Dolezal and has changed her name to Nkechi
Amare Diallo.280
No matter how much some people might scoff at Dolezal’s selfclassification, she appears to have a sincere, genuine and good-faith belief
that her racial identity is African-American. At the same time, granting her
judicial recognition as an African-American raises serious concerns. As
critics have rightfully noted:
By turning herself into a very, very, very, very light-skinned black woman,
Dolezal opens herself up to be treated as black by white society only to the
extent that they can visually identify her as such, and no amount of visual
change would provide Dolezal with the inherited trauma and socioeconomic
disadvantage of racial oppression in this country.281

In the coda to her surreal interview with Dolezal after the release of Dolezal’s
book In Full Color,282 Ijeoma Oluo poignantly recognizes the inherent
privilege undergirding Dolezal’s racial transformation, noting:
[I]t is white supremacy that told an unhappy and outcast white woman that
black identity was hers for the taking. It is white supremacy that told her

277

278
279
280
281

282

Associated Press, Disgraced NAACP Leader Rachel Dolezal Now Struggling to Get by: ‘My Life is Not a
Soundbite,’ ABC ACTION NEWS (Mar. 24, 2017, 7:44 AM), https://www.abcaction
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Ijeoma Oluo, The Heart of Whiteness: Ijeoma Oluo Interviews Rachel Dolezal, the White Woman Who Identifies
as Black, STRANGER, Apr. 19, 2017, https://www.thestranger.com/features/2017/04/
19/25082450/the-heart-of-whiteness-ijeoma-oluo-interviews-rachel-dolezal-the-white-woman-wh
o-identifies-as-black.
For failing to report royalties from sales of her book while collecting assistance from the state,
Dolezal was later charged with welfare fraud. See Matthew Haag, Rachel Dolezal, Who Pretended to Be
Black,
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TIMES
(May
25,
2018),
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that any black people who questioned her were obviously uneducated and
unmotivated to rise to her level of wokeness. It is white supremacy that then
elevated this display of privilege into the dominating conversation on black
female identity in America. It is white supremacy that decided that it was
worth a book deal, national news coverage, and yes—even this interview.283

To many, Dolezal’s gambit unfortunately appears to perpetuate the worst
form of race imperialism where even black identity itself is appropriated for
white ends. Though expressing his openness to the possibility of considering
Dolezal black, Jamielle Bouie remarked that he was troubled by the fact that
“it feels like Dolezal is adopting the culture without carrying the
burdens.”284 It did not help that, amidst the uproar, public records revealed
that she had actually filed a lawsuit in 2002 against Howard University for
discriminating against her—as a white woman.285
Even the most earnest belief in one’s affiliation with a particular racial
identity does not imbue someone with the shared experience of living as an
individual upon whom society imposes that particular racial identity. Thus,
while Dolezal should not suffer discrimination at the hands of her (chosen)
race, there is good reason to argue that she should not enjoy the benefits of
remedial action either. Such a bifurcation might be legally achievable by
drawing a distinction between one’s cis race and one’s chosen race and by
decoupling one’s ascriptive race from one’s preferred race.
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Oluo, supra note 281. Civil rights activist Rosa Clemente added that, “[a]s people of color, no
matter how hard we try, we cannot achieve whiteness, but the fact that a White woman can
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At the same time, courts may prefer to stay entirely out of the eligibilitydetermination game altogether. Randall Kennedy, for one, has argued that
the benefits that come with granting individuals the freedom to racially selfidentity far outweigh the potential risks of race fraud that may come with
such deference.286 He also discounts the likelihood of widespread race fraud,
noting:
[W]hites who may be tempted to pass for black for purposes of obtaining
affirmative-action benefits refrain from doing so . . . [because] the perceived
risks as a rule outweigh the perceived benefits. One risk, of course, is the
reputational harm associated with being revealed as a passer; another is the
risk that the masquerade may be all too successful and thus cause the white
passer to suffer the racial penalties that ‘real’ blacks continue to face. 287

It is possible that Kennedy failed to appreciate just how little shame some
people may have in manipulating their racial identity for strategic gains and
how, in a world of FERPA288 and other privacy protections, individuals may
not be called to task for their (false) representations on paper. For example,
Kennedy notes that “there are remarkably few instances on record in which
authorities challenged the participation of individuals in affirmative-action
programs on the basis of their not belonging to a given racial category of
designated beneficiaries.”289 However, this fact does not prove the problem
does not exist (or would not exist at even greater magnitude in a world where
legal precedent also supported and protected racial fluidity decisions). If
anything, it only suggests a deep reluctance on behalf of the bureaucratic and
legal machinery of the state to get involved in the project of racial
determination—a fact that would, to a sophisticated manipulator, even
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RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE, IDENTITY, AND ADOPTION
337 (2003) (“I, for one, believe that it would be better to tolerate some racial fraud, or even a
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Id. at 338.
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See KENNEDY, supra note 286.

November 2019]

CHANGING RACE

79

heighten the incentive to game the system since they have little fear of getting
caught or facing sanctions.
There is certainly good reason for the state and its various branches
(including the judiciary) to be weary of entering the fray on issues of racial
determination. After all, our history as a nation is littered with tragic
examples of when the government has done just that. But as this Article has
argued, it no longer makes sense to continue to operate our constitutional
jurisprudence on the assumption of racial immutability. It is an assumption
that does not reflect reality and, at the same time, the continued fetishization
of immutability in equal-protection doctrine has thwarted the evolution of
civil rights protection and our movement from a jurisprudence of mere
tolerance to one of acceptance. The death knell of the immutability
assumption therefore can serve as a blow against racial subordination
practices. As J. Allen Douglas has argued, the concept of racial immutability
has, for too long, served the interests of white supremacy by enforcing racial
divides and maintaining long-entrenched hierarchies.290 According to
Douglas, courts supportive of the immutability regime have, either
consciously or unwittingly, sought “to locate racial identity in the body in the
form of an object of property—an immutable, natural ‘thing’ possessed—to
ensure a means for ‘quieting title’ in whiteness”291—property interests which
our legal system has long served.292 As a result, recognition of mutability has
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J. Allen Douglas, The “Most Valuable Sort of Property”: Constructing White Identity in American Law, 18801940, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 881 (2003). For example, as Douglas documents, in the Plessy era,
courts often recognized defamation claims involving the improper denial of an individual’s
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the added potential to undo property interests in whiteness (or any racial
identity). In the process, we can perhaps move closer to achieving the
aspirational purpose of equal protection: the eradication of all forms of racial
subordination.

